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RE´SUME´
Un protocole d’e´change de cle´s est un sce´nario cryptographique entre deux partis
le´gitimes ayant besoin de se mettre d’accord sur une cle´ commune secre`te via un
canal public authentifie´ ou` tous les messages sont intercepte´s par un espion voulant
connaˆıtre leur secret. Nous conside´rons un canal classique et mesurons la complexite´
de calcul en termes du nombre d’e´valuations (requeˆtes) d’une fonction donne´e par
une boˆıte noire.
Ralph Merkle fut le premier a` proposer un sche´ma non classifie´ permettant de
re´aliser des e´changes securise´s avec des canaux non securise´s. Lorsque les partis
le´gitimes sont capables de faire O(N) requeˆtes pour un certain parame`tre N , tout
espion classique doit faire Ω(N2) requeˆtes avant de pouvoir apprendre leur secret,
ce qui est optimal. Cependant, un espion quantique peut briser ce sche´ma avec
O(N) requeˆtes. D’ailleurs, il a e´te´ conjecture´ que tout protocole, dont les partis
le´gitimes sont classiques, pourrait eˆtre brise´ avec O(N) requeˆtes quantiques.
Dans cette the`se, nous introduisons deux cate´gories des protocoles a` la Merkle.
Lorsque les partis le´gitimes sont restreints a` l’utilisation des ordinateurs classiques,
nous offrons le premier sche´ma classique suˆr. Il oblige tout adversaire quantique a`
faire Ω(N13/12) requeˆtes avant d’apprendre le secret. Nous offrons aussi un protocole
ayant une se´curite´ de Ω(N7/6) requeˆtes. En outre, pour tout k > 2, nous donnons
un protocole classique pour lequel les partis le´gitimes e´tablissent un secret avec
O(N) requeˆtes alors que la strate´gie optimale d’espionnage quantique ne´cessite
Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
requeˆtes, se rapprochant de Θ(N3/2) lorsque k croˆıt.
Lors les partis le´gitimes sont e´quipe´s d’ordinateurs quantiques, nous pre´sentons
deux protocoles supe´rieurs au meilleur sche´ma connu avant ce travail. En outre,
pour tout k > 2, nous offrons un protocole quantique pour lequel les partis le´gitimes
e´tablissent un secret avec O(N) requeˆtes alors que l’espionnage quantique optimale
ne´cessite Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
requeˆtes, se rapprochant de Θ(N2) lorsque k croˆıt.
Mots cle´s : Cryptographie, Algorithmes quantiques, Bornes infe´rieures
quantiques, Oracle ale´atoire.
ABSTRACT
Key agreement is a cryptographic scenario between two legitimate parties, who
need to establish a common secret key over a public authenticated channel, and
an eavesdropper who intercepts all their messages in order to learn the secret.
We consider query complexity in which we count only the number of evaluations
(queries) of a given black-box function, and classical communication channels.
Ralph Merkle provided the first unclassified scheme for secure communications
over insecure channels. When legitimate parties are willing to ask O(N) queries for
some parameter N , any classical eavesdropper needs Ω(N2) queries before being
able to learn their secret, which is is optimal. However, a quantum eavesdropper
can break this scheme in O(N) queries. Furthermore, it was conjectured that any
scheme, in which legitimate parties are classical, could be broken in O(N) quantum
queries.
In this thesis, we introduce protocols a` la Merkle that fall into two categories.
When legitimate parties are restricted to use classical computers, we offer the first
secure classical scheme. It requires Ω(N13/12) queries of a quantum eavesdropper
to learn the secret. We give another protocol having security of Ω(N7/6) queries.
Furthermore, for any k > 2, we introduce a classical protocol in which legitimate
parties establish a secret in O(N) queries while the optimal quantum eavesdropping
strategy requires Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
queries, approaching Θ(N3/2) when k increases.
When legitimate parties are provided with quantum computers, we present
two quantum protocols improving on the best known scheme before this work.
Furthermore, for any k > 2, we give a quantum protocol in which legitimate
parties establish a secret in O(N) queries while the optimal quantum eavesdropping
strategy requires Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
queries, approaching Θ(N2) when k increases.
Keywords: Cryptography, Quantum Algorithms, Quantum Lower Bounds,
Random Oracle.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Secrecy is a characteristic of mankind. People have always been concerned about
protecting valuable or private information from unauthorized access. One common
example is that of military commanders communicating with the troops or their
superiors. Other examples include financial and medical information.
On top of that, the exchange of a massive amount of confidential information,
such as electronic commerce and financial transactions, is taking place over the
Internet. As a consequence, secrecy has become in peril and tools to maintain
it become necessary. Techniques to remedy or at least to solve satisfactorily this
problem belong to cryptography, which is nowadays the science of all aspects of
privacy and information security, particularly secret communication and secret key
establishment.
Following closely Stinson’s classification [74], key establishment consists of any
approach or technique that allows legitimate parties to establish a common secret
key used to provide secure communication. Accordingly, we mainly distinguish
three approaches: key pre-distribution, session-key distribution and key agreement.
We describe these approaches later in a setting where there is a network of n users
and possibly a trusted authority who is responsible for verifying the identities of
users, transmitting keys, issuing certificates, etc.
In the next paragraph, we consider a cryptographic scenario that will be of
multipurpose pedagogical benefits. More precisely, it illustrates how to establish
secure communications over insecure channels despite efforts of any eavesdropper
(or adversary), and shows the root of the problem of establishing secret keys. It
also introduces the key agreement scenario that will be encountered from beginning
to end of this thesis.
2A typical cryptographic scenario is an everlasting story about three traditional
parties to which we refer as machines or persons. Alice and Bob, also called the
legitimate parties, want to communicate with each other over a public channel.
However, they suspect that a third party Eave (for gender-neutral eavesdropper)
is able to intercept their messages and for some reason determined to be privy to
their communications. Therefore, they have decided to use the following standard
cryptographic approach to preserve the confidentiality of their conversion.
When Alice wants to communicate with Bob, she does not send a message in
plaintext that is readable by anyone. Instead, she transforms it by some means
into a totally unreadable message called ciphertext (or cryptogram) in such a way
that Bob can recover it but Eave cannot. Bob proceeds similarly to reply. The
process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext is called encryption while the
process of transforming ciphertext back into plaintext is called decryption. Both
encryption and decryption are defined by a cipher (algorithm) and controlled by
a cryptographic ingredient called the secret key, which Alice and Bob establish
somehow. Devising such a “somehow” technique has been a major problem in
cryptography: How can Alice and Bob acquire this necessary random secret key?
For centuries, people have solved this problem using the key predistribution
paradigm requiring that (1) the channel is authenticated, meaning that legitimate
parties are sure they are talking to each other; and (2) legitimate parties must agree
on keys using secure channels prior to any secure communication. A secure channel
might be a clandestine place or a trusted courier for instance. This approach has
mainly been used in military and diplomacy applications in which communicants
could meet occasionally in secret places to agree upon keys compiled into special
books known as codebooks. Considering the Internet and wide use of electronic
commerce, the second requirement has become a major limitation for the large-
scale deployment of cryptography, and originated what is known historically as
the key “distribution” problem. Nowadays, the key establishment problem is more
accurate. We give a closer view on this problem by an example: if n entities want
to communicate securely with each other, then there are
(
n
2
)
= n(n−1)
2
≈ n2
2
secret
3keys that must be generated, distributed, stored, and destroyed in a highly secure
way. Even for moderately large n, the management of so many keys is infeasible
in practice. This paradigm also suffers from another problem when keys are used
in dynamic environments where new users join and others leave, which is usually
impractical or simply too expensive to transmit keys over secure channels [67].
In a session-key distribution paradigm, an online trusted third authority (or
key distribution centre) chooses session keys and distributes them to users who
requested them via an interactive protocol. Session keys are secret keys used to
encrypt information for a short period of time. These keys are sent encrypted by
the trusted authority using the key predistribution paradigm, that is, the previously
distributed secret keys to users. However, each entity must unconditionally trust
the authority and it would be possible to compromise any communication via the
centre. This approach is still typically used inside companies where each employee
can get his “master secret key”, which is used to derive session keys, in person
when hired.
Finally, the key agreement approach refers to an interactive protocol between
two parties that have no secret information in common and need to establish a
secret key over a public authenticated channel. The major difference with key
predistribution and session-key distribution is that the trusted authority is not
needed any more.
The first unclassified document ever written to solve the secret key agreement
problem and propose the notion of public key cryptography was a project proposal
written by Merkle in 1974 [63]. Merkle demonstrated that the key pre-agreement
requirement is not necessary by exhibiting a simple solution in such a fashion that
when legitimate parties are willing to spend an amount of computation proportional
to some parameter N , any classical eavesdropper needs to spend an amount of
computation proportional to N2 in order to obtain their established secret from
the classical communicated messages. He only assumed the existence of a “one-way
encryption function” [63], which can be formalized in the random oracle model that
we explain after the following paragraph.
4Shortly thereafter, Diffie and Hellman discovered a key agreement method that
makes the cryptanalytic complexity “apparently exponentially” harder than the
legitimate complexity [38]. However, even today, there is no formal security proof
for their method. All relies on the assumed difficulty of a mathematical problem,
namely on the conjectured difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem, which can
be solved efficiently using a quantum computer thanks to Shor’s algorithm [72]. In
fact, no public-key scheme in the literature has any formal security proof, including
RSA. In contrast, Merkle’s scheme offers provable quadratic security against any
possible classical attack under the assumption that the encryption function under
consideration can be inverted only by exhaustive search.
Now, we identify our security framework. First of all, we consider the random
oracle model, in which all parties have access to a public function f chosen uniformly
at random from the set of all possible functions from a domain D into a range R.
On any (new) input i ∈ D, this black-box (or oracle) function is evaluated in unit
time by asking a question to a magic black-box that outputs (randomly) f(i) ∈ R.
This interaction is called a query. It is very practical to think of such a function
as a string (or table) of symbols y where each symbol was chosen independently
and uniformly at random. If the domain size is S, then for all 1 6 i 6 S, this box
outputs yi on input i where yi ∈ R is a random value. Note that we can use binary
oracles provided we disregard logarithmic factors. For the key agreement scenario,
we assume that (1) the legitimate parties communicate through an authenticated
classical channel on which eavesdropping is unrestricted; (2) all parties have access
to the same oracle function and (3) a protocol is said to be secure whenever there
is a super-linear computational gap between the complexities of legitimate parties
and adversaries. In other words, for a fixed parameter N , legitimate parties make
O(N) queries while no adversary making O(N) queries can learn the secret, except
with o(1) probability over the views of the protocol. A view determines a random
run of the protocol in which Alice and Bob establish an n-bit secret using a random
oracle. We vary over runs of any involved party: randomness of Alice, randomness
of Bob, randomness of Eave, all possible choices of the n-bit secret and oracles.
5It was a major open question in classical cryptography whether Merkle’s method
is optimal in the black-box model. In other words, is it possible to have a larger
gap between the legitimate and eavesdropping complexities? In 1989, Impagliazzo
and Rudich showed that any adversary making O(N6 logN) queries can learn the
key of every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model in which Alice
and Bob make O(N) queries [49]. In 2008, Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary proved
that a quadratic gap between the legitimate and eavesdropping efforts is the best
possible in a classical world [8]. Sotakova [73] independently found a weaker result,
showing that protocols with only one round of interaction (each party sends one
message after querying the oracle) can achieve at most O(N2) security.
However, the situation is different in a world ruled by the quantum theory.
Using Grover’s algorithm [46], there is an obvious quantum attack that makes
Merkle’s scheme useless from a security point of view; the cryptanalytic task is as
easy (up to constant factors) as the key agreement process.
Grover’s algorithm (or its BBHT generalization [20]) is an extremely useful
quantum algorithm since it can solve the following unstructured common search
problem. For any integer K, we denote by [K] the set of integers from 1 to K.
Consider a black-box function f : [N ]→ {0, 1} with the promise that there exists
one and only one w ∈ [N ] such that f(w) = 1. The (OR) problem is to find this
w, which is then called a solution. Grover’s algorithm solves this problem with
bounded-error probability after O(
√
N ) quantum queries. Now, consider the same
problem, however, with t solutions. In this case, it is crucial to use a generalization
of Grover’s algorithm, which can find a solution in O(
√
N/t ) quantum queries.
Be aware that running (generalized) Grover’s algorithm more than necessary may
reduce the success probability down to zero!
It was commonly conjectured that secure key agreement in the random oracle
model is impossible. Therefore, it is natural to examine the following question: Can
Merkle’s scheme be made secure again if legitimate parties make use of quantum
computations?
6A first solution was proposed by Brassard and Salvail in 2008 [23]. Their idea is
essentially to consider Merkle’s scheme, allow Bob to use a quantum computer and
increase the function’s domain size from N2 to N3 in such a way that any quantum
eavesdropper needs Ω(
√
N3 ) = Ω(N3/2) queries [19]. Besides, it was conjectured
that their scheme is optimal in this setting. A number of questions come to light:
1. Is there a protocol that requires more than Ω(N3/2) queries of any quantum
eavesdropper if legitimate parties make use of quantum computations as well?
2. When legitimate parties only use classical computers, can any key agreement
protocol in the random oracle model be broken with O(N) quantum queries?
3. If the answer to Question 2 is no, then what is the optimal gap in this
restrictive scenario?
4. Can the quadratic security of Merkle’s scheme be restored if all parties make
use of quantum powers?
5. When legitimate parties are empowered with quantum computers, can every
key agreement protocol in the random oracle model be broken with O(N2)
quantum queries?
The main challenge in this framework is that communications are taking place
over a classical channel. Keep in mind that transmission of quantum information
is forbidden. Another challenge is when legitimate parties are classical while the
eavesdropper is allowed to use unrestricted quantum computations. Besides, the
computation resource to which all parties have access is the same random oracle
function. Therefore, throughout this study we will also be exploring the capabilities
and limitations of all these resources, guided by the following questions.
6. How strong is the random oracle model in a quantum world?
7. Are quantum computers advantageous for cryptographers or eavesdroppers,
considering key agreement in the oracle model?
8. Do quantum computers outperform their classical counterparts, considering
the new problems raised in this work?
71.2 Contributions
We give in this thesis several novel key agreement protocols, answering some of the
above open questions and making progress on others.
When Alice and Bob are empowered with quantum computers, we present two
secure (quantum) protocols that improve on the scheme of Brassard and Salvail
from Ω(N3/2) to Ω(N5/3) quantum queries, thus answering Question 1 positively.
The first protocol is based on the element distinctness problem while the second is
based on 2XOR. Without delay, we introduce these two problems.
Consider two positive integers N 6M and a black-box function f : [N ]→ [M ].
The element distinctness problem is to find a pair (i, j), 1 6 i < j 6 N , for which
f(i) = f(j), or return @ if they don’t exist. Consider now a black-box function
g : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ]. The 2XOR problem is to find a pair (i, j),
1 6 i < j 6 N , for which g(i)⊕ g(j) = w, or return @ otherwise. The operator
⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or. Note that the decision versions of the search
problems are usually considered in complexity theory when proving lower bounds.
When Alice and Bob are restricted to use classical computers, we present the
first classical protocol secure against any quantum adversary. Indeed, this scheme
forces any quantum eavesdropper to ask Ω(N13/12) quantum queries before being
able to learn the secret key, which answers Question 2 negatively. Furthermore, we
present an improved secure scheme providing security of Ω(N7/6) quantum queries.
As was the case in our quantum protocols, the Ω(N13/12) scheme is based on element
distinctness while the Ω(N7/6) scheme is based on 2XOR.
Furthermore, we made progress on Questions 3 and 4. We have discovered two
sequences of protocols denoted by Qk and Ck, for any fixed integer k > 2, with the
following properties.
In protocol Qk, a classical Alice establishes a secret with a quantum Bob after
O(N) accesses to a random oracle in such a way that the optimal quantum eaves-
dropping strategy requires of the eavesdropper to query the same random oracle
Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
times, thus approaching Θ(N2) in the limit. Therefore, key agreement
8protocols in the random oracle model can be arbitrarily as secure in our quantum
world as they were known to Merkle in 1974. Thus, almost quadratic security can
be restored in a quantum world.
In protocol Ck, classical Alice and Bob establish a secret after O(N) queries to
a random oracle in such a way that the optimal quantum eavesdropping strategy
requires Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
queries, which tends to Θ(N3/2) when k increases. Hence,
classical Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key against any quantum eavesdropper
with as good a security (in the limit) as it was known to be possible before when
Alice and Bob are enabled with quantum computers [23].
1.3 Related Work
We mention in this section selected work, directly useful or related somehow to our
research topic, grouped into several categories. We also define several problems of
particular importance not only in this work but in classical and quantum computer
science in general. The search versions of these problems characterize better our
cryptographic scenario. However, their decision versions are often considered in
complexity theory since a lower bound for a decision problem is simpler to prove
and implies directly a lower bound for its search version.
Collision and Element Distinctness Problems. A collision for a function
f is a pair of distinct elements i, j such that f(i) = f(j). Deciding whether a
collision occurs in a function f is equivalent to deciding whether f is injective,
that is, whether f is one-to-one, which is the element distinctness problem. The
problem is important in cryptography, because it enables modelling fundamental
primitives (hash functions), and of general importance in classical and quantum
computer science. A function f : [N ]→ [M ] is said to be r-to-one, for an integer r
dividing N , if every element in its image has exactly r pre-images.
The first quantum algorithm that finds collisions in r-to-one functions was
given by Brassard, Høyer and Tapp [25], providing novel applications of Grover’s
algorithm. When f is r-to-one, their algorithm finds a collision after O( 3
√
N/r )
9expected function evaluations. In particular, when f is two-to-one, this algorithm
finds a collision after O( 3
√
N ) evaluations. In contrast, Θ(
√
N ) evaluations are
necessary and sufficient for a classical algorithm to find a collision even allowing
randomization. They also presented a quantum algorithm for claw-finding. A claw
in functions f and g having the same range is a pair of elements i, j such that
f(i) = g(j), which is closely related to the notion of collisions.
Inspired by these algorithms, Buhrman, Du¨rr, Heiligman, Høyer, Magniez,
Sa´ntha and de Wolf [32] gave several applications of amplitude amplification [26]
to find collisions and claws in unrestricted functions, yielding an O(N3/4 logN)
collision-finding quantum algorithm, which implies an O(N3/4 logN) upper bound
for element distinctness. They also gave an Ω(
√
N ) quantum lower bound for
element distinctness, using a reduction from the OR problem. The complexity mea-
sure they used is the number of comparisons between elements. However, all their
bounds remain the same up to logarithmic factors if they want to count the num-
ber of function evaluations instead. In the comparison-based oracle model, when
we query a given black-box function f on (i, j), the oracle outputs the truth-value
(0 or 1) of the statement “f(i) 6 f(j)”.
Using the polynomial method [10], Aaronson and Shi [2] proved that any quan-
tum algorithm for finding collisions in r-to-one functions must evaluate the function
Ω( 3
√
N/r ) times, matching the upper bound of Brassard, Høyer and Tapp [25].
Thus, this is optimal – even for the decision version of this problem. Furthermore,
they derived a lower bound of Ω(N2/3) queries for element distinctness, using a
reduction from a variant of the collision problem. Their paper is in fact the fruit
of two separate closely related earlier publications [1, 71].
In the other direction, Ambainis gave an O(N2/3) quantum query algorithm [4]
for element distinctness, which proceeds by quantum walks on Johnson graphs,
improving on theO(N3/4) algorithm [32] and matching the Ω(N2/3) lower bound [2].
The proof of Aaronson and Shi [2] is applicable only when the range size M of
the function is such that M > 3N/2. If M = N , the lower bound becomes Ω( 4
√
N).
Fortunately, Ambainis [6] and Kutin [53] independently removed this constraint.
10
In fact, Ambainis gave a general method to prove lower bounds for problems with
small range. He proved that for any symmetric property (or problem) defined on
some function f : [N ] → [M ] the polynomial degree is the same for any M > N .
In other words, for any function of range size M , the quantum query lower bound
proved using the polynomial method implies immediately the same lower bound
for any M > N . A property f is symmetric if it remains the same if we permute
the inputs before applying f or permute the outputs after applying f . Therefore,
the lower bounds for collision and element distinctness remain valid even with
small range, since both problems are symmetric. Hence, element distinctness is
solved optimally in Θ(N2/3) quantum queries without restrictions on the range.
Eventually, Belovs proved the lower bound for element distinctness [13] using the
negative (or generalized) adversary method [80, 81]. Notice that classical lower
bounds for element distinctness have been known since decades [45, 57, 65].
In the aforementioned paper [4], Ambainis also gave an O(N
k
k+1 ) quantum algo-
rithm for element k-distinctness problem, which is to decide whether or not there
exist k pre-images mapped to the same image under a given function f . It is
a generalization of his element distinctness algorithm and related to the optimal
quantum attacks against our generalized protocols described in Chapter 6. He left
open whether his algorithm for k-element distinctness is optimal. Answering this
question negatively, Belovs provided a more efficient algorithm [14] having query
complexity O(N1−2
k−2/2k−1) or more compactly o(N3/4).
Shortly after Ambainis’s paper, Childs and Eisenberg observed that Ambainis’s
quantum algorithm for k-element distinctness is much more general than what it
was designed to resolve. More precisely, this algorithm gives the means to solve
any problem that can be modelled as the subset-finding problem having any given
property. Indeed, they mentioned several related applications, for instance finding
a set of k consecutive function values, relatively prime function values, k-clique in
an N -vertex graph, and variants of the kSUM problem. They also provided a much
simpler query-complexity analysis than that of the original paper [4]. On the other
hand, they left open which of their algorithms for subset finding is or are optimal.
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kSUM. In addition to element distinctness and 2XOR, the kSUM problem is
essential in this thesis. Let s be an arbitrary element of a finite abelian group
G and consider a positive integer k. Given elements x1, . . . , xN of G, the kSUM
problem is to find a subset of k elements that sum to s, or return @ if such subset
does not exist. Actually, any problem based on the ⊕ is special case of kSUM,
which is in turn related to element k-distinctness.
Belovs and Sˇpalek [15] proved that the subset-finding quantum algorithm for
kSUM [36] is optimal, using the generalized adversary method (or bound). Except
for this work, we don’t know of any other cryptographic application considering the
kSUM problem in the random oracle model. However, 3SUM has been well studied
and a long-standing problem in the classical time-complexity literature. The best
known algorithm takes Θ(N2) time [42], commonly believed to be optimal.
Oblivious Transfer a` la Merkle. The notion of oblivious transfer was orig-
inally introduced in Wiesner’s paper [77], which served as inspiration for the in-
vention of quantum key distribution [16]. Unfortunately, it was only published in
1983, making a more pathetic story than that of Merkle’s scheme [63]! However,
in 1981 Rabin was the first to publish it [68]. The original version of oblivious
transfer (OT) is a formalization of an erasure channel with probability 1/2 and can
be described as follows. Alice (the sender) sends a bit b to Bob (the receiver) via
an OT machine. With probability 1/2, Bob receives b and with complementary
probability he receives the symbol ⊥ (nothing), which is just an evidence that a
bit was sent but the information was lost during the communication. Note that
Alice does not know whether or not her bit was received. An equivalent primitive is
1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, which was invented in 1985 by Even, Goldreich, and
Lempel [41]. In this variant, Alice has two secret messages (instead of one bit) and
Bob receives one of them at random without gaining any information about the
other message. Again Alice should not know which message Bob received. More
formally, Alice inputs two secret messages m0 and m1 into the OT machine that
flips a coin and sends one of the messages with equal probabilities.
Be aware that the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer has been used in the litera-
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ture slightly differently: Alice inputs two secret messages m0 and m1 into the OT
machine to which Bob inputs one bit b to indicate which input he would like to
receive. The machine outputs mb and discards m1−b. Summing up, at the end of
the protocol, Alice cannot learn any information about b and Bob learns mb but
nothing about the other message.
Shown to be a universal primitive for two-party computation by Kilian [52],
oblivious transfer is fundamental in cryptography. A box that implements a perfect
oblivious transfer between two participants would give them means to achieve an
arbitrary two-input computations with information-theoretic security.
Merkle’s idea was used beyond key agreement by Brassard, Salvail and Tapp [28].
Considering the birthday problem (“paradox”) and one-way permutations, they in-
troduced a classical oblivious transfer scheme and proved that a classical cheater
requires Θ(t3/2) permutation queries, where t is the legitimate amount of queries
needed to implement it. A quantum adversary, however, breaks this scheme after
O(t5/6) queries, which is more efficient than running the legitimate protocol! Al-
lowing honest parties to use quantum computers, they also present another scheme
against which their best quantum attack makes O(t4/3) queries. It is still an open
question whether this attack is optimal.
Bounded-Memory Model. The bounded-storage (or bounded-memory) model
was proposed by Maurer [61] to achieve provable cryptographic schemes even
against adversaries with unlimited computational resources. There is no computa-
tional hardness assumption like the prime factoring or discrete logarithm problems.
The only assumption is that the adversary’s memory size is bounded by a value s.
The main idea is the following. A random t-bit string R is available temporarily
to all parties, and can be broadcast by a satellite, transmitted over a network
or stored on a public high-density storage media. The string R is much larger
than the adversary’s memory capacity, meaning that he can store only partial
information about R. However, he can use unlimited computing power to calculate
any probabilistic function f : {0, 1}t → {0, 1}s. As long as the function’s output
size does not exceed the available memory, security in the above sense is maintained.
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More precisely, Alice and Bob randomly select a small subset of R and each
stores these values, afterwards R disappears. In this model, legitimate parties
initially share a random short secret key that determines which bits of R they
need to access and how they must process these bits in order to derive a longer
secret key. Because of the random selection of the subset and Eave’s memory
size, he may have at most partial knowledge about this fraction of R. Therefore,
legitimate parties can apply privacy amplification [18] in order to distill a perfectly
secret key, that is, generate a key about which Eave has essentially no information
even using unlimited computing power. Note that even after privacy amplification,
which reduces the input key, the final secret key is much longer than the initial
key. Summing up, the goal in this model is key expansion rather than establishing
secret keys.
The bare bounded-storage model is another framework that was proposed by
Cachin and Maurer [33]. In this model, legitimate parties who share no initial key
proceed as follows. Each stores a random subset of O(
√
t ) bits of a random t-bit
string R, which is much more than the selected subset in the previous model. After
R disappears, they agree on the commonly chosen bits, which exist considering
the birthday problem. On the other hand, with overwhelming probability, Eave
has only partial information about these bits so that legitimate parties can apply
privacy amplification [18] to distill a perfectly secret key.
Dziembowski and Maurer [40] proved that secure key agreement in the bare
bounded-memory model is impossible unless legitimate parties have memory size
in O(
√
s ), which is so large that the practicality of this approach (without an
initially shared short key) is inherently limited. This is the same optimal quadratic
gap between the number of queries of legitimate parties and that of eavesdroppers in
the random oracle model. Cryptography in the bounded quantum-memory model
was considered by Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail and Schaffner [37].
Quantum Computation. Our proposed protocols and the related problems
may entail understanding the capabilities and limitations of quantum computers.
Indeed, it is widely believed that quantum computing is promising. However,
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building a quantum computer faces theoretical as well as technological challenging
obstacles, in particular providing convincing arguments that a quantum computer
is much more useful than a classical counterpart. These arguments mainly are
(1) designing quantum algorithms significantly more efficient than their classical
counterparts; (2) identifying old and/or new problems that give the means to un-
derstand the power and limitations of the quantum computing theory such as
pseudo-telepathy [27, 30]; and (3) discover ideas that have no classical counterpart
such as entanglement, teleportation and quantum key distribution. Our schemes
are useful in the sense of the first two motivations because they provide problems
for which quantum algorithms are provably better than their classical equivalents.
Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms are the most important quantum algorithms at
the time of writing. The first one has at least two major known applications: solving
the prime factoring and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time. However,
Grover’s algorithm and its generalization have many applications since plenty of
important problems in computer science can be reduced to search problems. Such
problems range from sorting to graph colouring to attacking cryptographic proto-
cols. Merkle’s schemes, their quantum variant and our new protocols can also be
reduced to search problems.
1.4 Outline
The remaining material of this thesis is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given
in Chapter 2, and Merkle’s scheme as well as its quantum variant are discussed in
Chapter 3. Our contributions are divided into Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The first
consists of two protocols in the quantum setting while the second contains two
protocols in which the legitimate parties are restricted to classical computation.
Chapter 6 contains our two families of improved generalized protocols. Finally, we
conclude and raise some open questions in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Notations and Notions
For any positive integer K, the set [K] consists of all integers from 1 to K and
[K]′ denotes [K] ∪ {0}. The set {0, 1}n denotes the set of all possible n-bit stings.
Generally, given a non-empty set S, we denote by Sn the set of all possible strings
of exactly n elements of S. We denote by {0, 1}∗ the set of all finite binary strings
and {0, 1}∞ the set of all infinite ones. The set of natural numbers is denoted by
N while R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers. The notation | · | is used
to denote the length of a string or the size of a set, depending on the context.
A probabilistic algorithm has access to uniform random bits (unbiased coin flips).
Equivalently, a randomized or probabilistic algorithm is given, in addition to its
input, a uniformly distributed bit-string of sufficient length (see Section 2.10).
An algorithm A is said to run in polynomial time if there is a polynomial p(·)
such that for every input x, its output A(x) terminates within at most p(|x|) steps.
Definition 2.1.1 (Negligible Function). A function f : N→ R+ is negligible in n
if for every real constant c > 0 there exists nc such that f(n) <
1
nc
for all n > nc.
In other words, negligible describes any function that decreases faster than
the inverse of any positive polynomial. This definition is meaningful in standard
cryptography (without oracle), in which the required level of security is at least
super-polynomial. However, the security level in our context (oracle model) is
polynomial. Therefore, what we need is the notion of vanishing probability instead.
Definition 2.1.2 (Vanishing Function). A function f : N→ R+ is vanishing in n
if for every real constant c > 0 there exists nc such that f(n) < c for all n > nc.
Equivalently, a vanishing function is in o(1). We might also specify how fast a
function tends to zero. For instance, the function 1/N2 is quadratically vanishing.
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2.2 Random Function
We consider throughout this thesis the set (or family) of all functions from D to R,
denoted by Func(D,R) or Func(`, L) for convenience. Specifically, we are interested
only in functions whose domain D and range R are finite. Formally, we consider
D = {0, 1}` and R = {0, 1}L for some integers `, L > 1 representing the input
length and the output length, respectively.
In this framework, the two notions “random function” and “choose a function at
random” are equivalent [11], which we explain immediately and differently. Assume
that each element f ∈ Func(D,R) is uniquely identified by an index i ∈ I, where I
is the finite set of all possible indices. There is a (uniform) probability distribution
on the set of indices, thus inducing the same probability distribution on Func(D,R).
To choose a function at random, we choose an index i ∈ I at random and then
consider the element (instance) fi. The equivalence of the two notions is so crucial
to understand that we encapsulate them in the following definition.
Definition 2.2.1 (Random functions). Let D = {0, 1}` and R = {0, 1}L be two
non-empty sets, where `, L > 1 are two positive integers. Consider the set of all
functions from D to R, denoted by Func(D,R) or Func(`, L). A random function
mapping `-bits to L-bits is an element of Func(`, L) chosen uniformly at random.
Classically, a good way to think about a random function may be the following:
the value assigned to any new point in the domain is randomly and independently
selected from the range. However, this might be misleading or a bad viewpoint in
the quantum framework as we will explain later.
It will be useful to compute the size of the set Func(`, L). To specify a function
it is necessary and sufficient to provide its value on any element in its domain. More
precisely, think about a function f ∈ Func(`, L) as a huge look-up table such that
each row contains one possible input x coupled with its image f(x). Since there
are 2` possible inputs and each input needs L bits to specify the output value, any
function can be represented by 2` ·L bits. Hence, there are 22`·L possible functions
in total.
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2.3 Random Oracle
Oracles are a very useful tool to provide an idealized implementation of a function.
Although defined and used differently in complexity theory and cryptography, they
share the following properties in both fields:
1. Abstraction: think about an oracle as a magic box that answers well defined
questions.
2. Efficiency : the oracle’s answer to any point in the domain is computed in
unit time (or perhaps in polynomial time in computational complexity).
Informally, a random oracle is an oracle incorporating randomness in its outputs.
There are two main formal definitions for random oracles, one in computational
complexity by Bennett and Gill [17] and other in complexity-based cryptography.
Definition 2.3.1 (Random oracles in complexity theory). A random oracle asso-
ciates the result of a coin toss to each string, that is a map O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}.
Oracles in cryptography were first used by Brassard [21], as pointed out by
Impagliazzo and Rudich [49]. However, the random oracle paradigm was formalized
and defended by Bellare and Rogaway [12], who defined a random oracle as a map
O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∞ to avoid fixing its output length. Inspired by [12, 49], we
give the following definition, capturing the integer random oracles.
Definition 2.3.2 (Random oracles in cryptography). A random oracle is a map
O : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}L(`) that assigns, to each (new) input, an integer (chosen
uniformly at random) from a finite range whose size is a function L of an ` > 1.
2.4 Black-Box Function (Random Function Oracle)
With each random oracle we associate a function from `-bit strings to L-bits strings.
As we vary over all possible oracles O, we get all corresponding functions, “each
with the same frequency” [49], thus we get the family of functions Func(`, L). The
notions of random oracles and random function oracles will be used interchangeably.
18
We treat any random instance f ∈ Func(D,R) intuitively in the following sense.
The function f is placed in a box impossible to look inside, and evaluated on any
input only by asking questions to this box, which returns f(x) on an input x. This
access or interaction is referred to as querying the box (or f) on x, which is itself
called the query x to the function. In cryptography, any query is assumed to be
computed in a unit time.
It might be useful to think of the function f as black-box that contains a tuple
y = (y1 . . . y2`) and outputs yi on input i where yi is chosen randomly in R.
Needless to say, although we consider integer oracles, our analyses also remain
valid for binary oracles, provided we disregard logarithmic factors. An oracle may
be classical or quantum. Queries in the quantum setting must be reversible and
are often done in superposition.
Choosing a function f at random implies that the box is programmed to output
answers according to f . More precisely, we assume that the full specification of this
function is available in the box once it is chosen. This view is always considered in
the quantum computation context, where queries are often done in superposition.
Though, there is another classical dynamic view: queries are evaluated one by one.
2.5 Random Oracle Model
The random oracle model in cryptography was introduced to be a bridge between
theoretical cryptography and practical one for the sake of designing secure schemes.
This methodology mainly consists of two steps.
First, one designs and proves the security of an ideal system in which all parties
(including adversaries) have access to an oracle, that is, a public uniformly-chosen
function in a particular family of functions. Second, once the first step is fulfilled,
one replaces the random oracle by a public “secure cryptographic hash function”.
For more details refer to the paper of Bellare and Rogaway [12], who explicitly
formulated and defended this popular methodology. Another reference that covers
well this topic is the class notes of Bellare and Rogaway [11].
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2.6 Key Agreement
The task we will study in this thesis is the secret-key agreement in the random
oracle model, which we define here for our convenience. Notice that key agreement
is one of the key establishment approaches reviewed in the introduction.
A key agreement protocol is an interactive protocol between a pair of two prob-
abilistic linear query algorithms (or machines) Alice and Bob, having no-secret
information in common, to establish a secret over a public authenticated channel.
Each party has a set of private tapes: a random-bit tape, an input tape, a work
tape and a secret tape. In addition, they have a common communication channel,
which both can read and write. We consider only protocols restricted to one round
of interaction, meaning that each legitimate party queries the oracle a number of
times proportional to some fixed parameter, makes some computations, and sends
a message to the other party.
A typical run of the protocol can be viewed as follows: Alice and Bob receive
a security parameter n and are given access to a black-box function. Next, Alice
queries the oracle on random distinct points, communicates via the channel and
writes an n-bit string on her secret tape. Bob does similarly. If the secret strings
are the same, then Alice and Bob are said to agree. The entire history of their
writings on the channel is known as the conversation or the transcript.
On the opposite side, a probabilistic linear query algorithm Eave (eavesdropper)
is determined to learn the secret, having full knowledge of the conversation (between
Alice and Bob) and access to the same black-box function.
For convenience, we refer to Alice and Bob as persons occasionally. However,
Eave, which replaces the traditional Eve, is gender-neutral (or a daemon).
Note that the assumption “authenticated channel” is unavoidable in any key
agreement scenario. It ensures that any adversarial attempt to modify a message
or inject a new one into the conversion can be detected by legitimate parties.
Establishing secret keys over a public unauthenticated channel is impossible! This
section and the next one is closely based on Impagliazzo and Rudich’s work [49].
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2.6.1 View of Protocol
We investigate a random world where Alice and Bob try to establish an n-bit secret.
More precisely, we vary over runs of Alice, Bob, Eave, and oracles. Formally, a
“world situation” or view is 5-tuple (n, ra, rb, re,O). The first entry n is the input,
and O is a random oracle. The secret random-bit tapes ra, rb, re are assigned to
Alice, Bob and Eave, respectively. Let Vn be the set of all views where Alice and
Bob attempt to agree on an n-bit secret. One might think of Vn as a probability
space with the uniform distribution. A view determines a random run of the
protocol using a random oracle.
2.7 Security Model
Security definition of a cryptographic scheme may consist of three parts: 1) define
the notion “secure” or equivalently its negation “break”; 2) specify the computation
power of all involved parties as well as the computation resources (e.g., oracle) to
which they have access; and 3) identify the type or level of required security.
In this section we decide on the security framework of secret-key agreement
protocols in the random oracle model, which is different from that of standard
cryptography. To understand better the former, it is useful to introduce first the
well-known framework of standard cryptography, picking out the key agreement
task as our running example for this purpose.
2.7.1 Computational Complexity Model
Current standard cryptography is based on the fundamental assumption P 6= NP
in computational complexity [44], thus it is called complexity-based cryptography.
More precisely, a legitimate cryptographic algorithm runs efficiently (polynomial
time). Nevertheless, an adversary is not able to break this scheme unless given at
least a super-polynomial time. A scheme is said to be “broken” if an adversary can
know a part of the established secret key or even distinguish it from a randomly
selected key.
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Rooted in complexity theory, this framework inherits three essential notions:
the asymptotic approach, efficient or feasible algorithms, and negligible functions.
In complexity-based cryptography any scheme has a security parameter n so that
the running time of the honest parties, the running time of the adversary, and
the adversary’s success probability are all measured asymptotically in terms of n.
This important property is useful to make formal and rigorous security proofs. An
efficient algorithm is a deterministic or probabilistic polynomial algorithm whose
time complexity is polynomial in n. A negligible function in n is smaller than the
inverse of any positive polynomial (Definition 2.1.1).
Having clarified all the important notions, we specify the framework of the
contemporary applied cryptography:
1. Legitimate parties initialize the cryptographic scheme after fixing a value for
its security parameter n whose value is assumed to be known by the adversary.
2. Legitimate parties run efficiently.
3. Security is maintained only against efficient adversaries. Clearly, any scheme
can be broken by a super-polynomial time strategy, which is so unfeasible
that such threats are not considered. That is why this approach provides
only computational security, contrasting with information-theoretic security
based on the fact that adversaries do not have enough information regardless
of their computational resources power (see more in Stinson’s textbook [74]).
4. An efficient adversary succeeds in breaking any scheme only with negligible
probability.
5. A scheme must be secure in most cases or have “average-case hardness”.
6. An adversary should not be able even to distinguish the established secret
key from a truly random key except with negligible probability.
Modern cryptography is well covered in the textbooks [44, 60, 62, 74]. Now, we
give a formal definition of the standard notion of security.
Definition 2.7.1 (Asymptotic security). A scheme is secure if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary can break the scheme except with negligible probability.
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2.7.2 Random Oracle Model
Here is the security framework in the random oracle paradigm, after making two
essential relaxations of the notions of standard cryptography, namely efficient and
negligible.
1. Legitimate parties decide on the security parameter and a random function
oracle (chosen as in Section 2.2) whose domain size is a function of some
parameter N . Related to the oracle, the value of N is assumed to be public
and the function is accessible to all parties.
2. Legitimate algorithms are linear query ones, meaning that each party asks
O(N) queries.
3. Security is maintained only against linear query eavesdroppers : any scheme
can be broken by an adversary asking the oracle a super-linear in N queries.
Comparing with standard cryptography, an “efficient” algorithm is one whose
query complexity is linear rather than polynomial. It is crucial to keep this
in mind. A protocol is secure if no probabilistic linear query algorithm Eave
can break it (guess the secret) except with o(1) probability (this is vanishing).
This notion is meaningful since any classical protocol in the oracle model can
be broken in O(N2) queries [8]. In the quantum case it is even worse.
4. A linear query adversary A can succeed in breaking any scheme only with
o(1) probability. Thus, repeating A a constant number of times does not
harm the security. However, repeating it a sub-linear or even logarithmic
number of times can amplify the success probability as close to 1 as desired.
5. We require a scheme to be hard to break in most cases or on the average
(“average-case hardness”), similarly to standard cryptography.
6. In contrast with standard cryptography, the security concern here is that no
adversary can find the secret or even a part of it.
Definition 2.7.2 (Security in the random oracle model). A scheme is secure if no
probabilistic linear query algorithm is able to break it except with o(1) probability
over all the possible random oracles under consideration.
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2.8 Common Problems and Their Query Complexities
We review in this section several problems inherently related to our protocols.
Although we consider the search versions in the cryptographic context, decision
versions are examined to prove lower bounds. In the following material, N and M
are positive integers.
2.8.1 The Collision Problem and Its Generalization
Consider a function f : [N ]→ [M ] and an integer r > 1 with r dividing N . We say
that f is r-to-one if every element in its image has exactly r preimages. A collision
for f consists of two distinct elements i, j ∈ [N ] such that f(i) = f(j).
Definition 2.8.1 (The r-to-one collision problem). Let f be a black-box function
with the promise that it is either one-to-one or r-to-one. The r-to-one collision
problem is to distinguish between these two cases. In particular, the collision prob-
lem is to decide whether f is two-to-one or one-to-one.
Importantly, the collision problem reduces to element distinctness [1, 2]. Briefly,
if the first problem requires T queries, then element distinctness requires T 2 queries.
Theorem 2.8.2 (Lower bound [2]). Let n > 0 and r > 2 be integers with r|n,
and let a function of domain size n be given as an oracle with the promise that it
is either one-to-one or r-to-one. Then any error-bounded quantum algorithm for
distinguishing these two cases must query the function Ω((n/r)1/3) times. Thus,
finding a collision in an r-to-one function of domain size n requires Ω((n/r)1/3)
queries.
2.8.2 The Element Distinctness Problem and Its Generalization
Definition 2.8.3 (Element distinctness). Given a black-box function ξ : [N ]→ [M ],
the element distinctness problem (ED) is to decide whether there exists a pair (i, j),
1 6 i < j 6 N , for which ξ(i) = ξ(j).
24
This problem can be generalized to what is known as the element k-distinctness
or k-element distinctness.
Definition 2.8.4 (k-Element distinctness). Given as input a black-box function
ξ : [N ]→ [M ], the k-element distinctness problem is to decide whether or not there
exists k indices i1, . . . , ik for which ξ(i1) = ξ(i2) = · · · = ξ(ik).
Theorem 2.8.5 (Upper bound [4]). Element k-distinctness can be solved by a
quantum algorithm with O(Nk/(k+1)) queries. In particular, element distinctness
can be solved in O(N2/3) quantum queries.
Belovs designed a more efficient algorithm for element k-distinctness as stated
by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8.6 (Upper bound [14]). For an arbitrary fixed integer k > 2, the
element k-distinctness problem can be solved by a bounded-error quantum algorithm
in O(N1−2
k−2/2k−1) quantum queries.
2.8.3 The Subset-Finding Problem
Childs and Eisenberg [36] proved that Ambainis’s quantum algorithm for k-element
distinctness [4] actually solves the subset-finding problem (SF), which is very useful.
Suppose that we are given as input a black-box function f : D → R and a
property P ⊂ (D×R)k where D and R are finite and |D| = N . The problem is to
output some k-subset {x1, . . . , xk} ⊂ D such that ((x1, f(x1), . . . , (xk, f(xk))) ∈ P .
Theorem 2.8.7 (Upper bound [36]). The quantum query complexity of k-subset
finding is O(Nk/(k+1)).
2.8.4 The kXOR Problem
Definition 2.8.8 (kXOR problem). We are given as input a black-box function
ξ : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ]. The kXOR problem is to decide whether or not
there exists k indices i1, . . . , ik for which ξ(i1)⊕ ξ(i2)⊕ . . . ξ(ik) = w.
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The case k = 2 is specially important since we use it in two of our protocols
and reduce element distinctness to it in Section 4.2.3. Therefore, it is worth having
a separate definition.
Definition 2.8.9 (2XOR problem). We are given as input a black-box function
ξ : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ]. The 2XOR problem is to decide whether or not
there exists a pair (i, j), 1 6 i < j 6 N , for which ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w.
2.8.5 The kSUM Problem
We first give the definition to which the lower bound theorem [15] is applied. The
general definition follows.
Definition 2.8.10 (kSUM). Consider an arbitrary element t of a finite abelian
group G. For any given positive integer k, the kSUM problem is to decide whether
the elements x1, . . . , xN ∈ G contains a subset of k distinct elements that sum to t.
Theorem 2.8.11 (Lower bound for kSUM [15]). For a fixed positive integer k,
the quantum query complexity of the kSUM problem is Ω(Nk/k+1) provided that
|G| > Nk.
Here is another definition that we might encounter in the literature.
Definition 2.8.12 (kSUM’s another definition). We are given as input a black-box
function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ]. The kSUM problem is to find k indices,
i1, . . . , ik, for which ξ(i1) + ξ(i2) + · · ·+ ξ(ik) = w, or return @ if they don’t exist.
2.8.6 The Birthday Problem (or “Paradox”)
Consider any set X containing N elements such that Pr(x) = 1/N for all x ∈ X.
Pick randomly and with replacement n elements of X. What is the probability
that at least two of these n elements will be the same? This event is commonly
referred to as collision [74] and denoted by Coll.
This problem is solved using a probability argument analogous to the “birthday
paradox”, which says that in a group of 23 randomly chosen persons, at least two
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will have the same birthday with probability greater than 1/2. Although it probably
seems counter-intuitive, it is not a paradox at all after calculations. Therefore, we
will refer to it as the birthday problem.
The upper bound on this probability will be invoked frequently. Therefore, we
write it explicitly:
Pr[Coll] 6 n · (n− 1)
2N
<
n2
2N
.
This inequality can be obtained taking into account the n · (n− 1)/2 possible pairs
(count only pairs of distinct elements) and using the union-bound.
We equally need to have an expression that relates all the involved parameters.
The probability of finding at least one collision is estimated to be at least
1− e−12 (n−1)n/N ≈ 1− e−n
2
2N .
Denoting this probability by ε, we can find a good approximation that relates
ε, n and N , which is formulated as follows:
n ≈
√
2N ln
1
1− ε.
Therefore, for
n >
√
2 ln 2
√
N ≈ 1.17
√
N,
at least two outcomes will be the same with probability at least 1/2. This problem
is well proved and presented from a cryptographic viewpoint by Stinson [74].
Being frequently interested in avoiding collisions in functions, we need to set
a lower bound on the range size. We achieve this task in detail in Section 5.3.4.
Finally, observe that there are several manifestations of this important problem.
For instance, the study of collisions between two subsets is discussed by Joux [50].
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2.9 Computing Partial Boolean Function
We consider partial functions or promise problems, which are decision problems for
which the input is promised to be drawn from a subset of the function domain.
Partial functions are useful and general enough to achieve our computation goals.
Usually lower bounds for partial functions are easier to find and imply directly
lower bounds for general functions.
Let f ∈ Func(D,R) be an oracle function, and let D = [N ] and R = [M ] for
convenience. The objective is to determine whether or not f has a specific property.
For example, “Is f one-to-one or two-to-one?” or “Are there k pre-images under
f that sum to some given integer w?”. More formally, we would like to compute a
partial Boolean function F : F → {0, 1}, where F ⊆ [M ]N . For example, F(f) = 1
if the input function f is one-to-one and F(f) = 0 if f is two-to-one. Clearly, F can
take binary oracles as input by restricting M to {0, 1}.
2.10 Classical Algorithmic Review
Here is a reminder of some classical algorithmic concepts, which may be helpful
to understand their quantum counterparts. Before starting, recall that our goal is
to compute some partial Boolean function F : [M ]N → {0, 1} where the input is
a finite tuple x = x1x2 . . . xN given as a black-box. The material of this section
is mainly based on references [22, 31, 78]. Throughout this section, we consider
algorithms in the random access model. We will assume analogous quantum model,
in particular the quantum random access memory (see Section 2.11.3).
2.10.1 Bounded-Error Probabilistic Algorithm
Most of problems have unknown efficient algorithms (deterministic or probabilistic)
that are able to return the correct and exact solution every time. Here probabilistic
means that an algorithm is able to make random choices (coin flips) that hope-
fully guide it to the correct solution more quickly. Probabilistic or randomized
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algorithms might be divided into two categories: bounded-error (Monte Carlo)
algorithms and zero-error (Las Vegas) algorithms. We deal with the first category.
While the answer returned by a deterministic algorithm is always correct, if no
hardware error occurs, a Monte Carlo algorithm occasionally makes mistakes, but
it finds solutions with high probability whatever the instance under consideration.
There must be no instance on which the probability of error is high. A Monte Carlo
Algorithm A is called p-correct, for 0 < p < 1, if it returns the correct answer with
probability at least p whatever the instance considered [22].
An algorithm A computes F with bounded-error ε if its output equals F(x) with
probability at least p = 1− ε for every x in the domain. The complexity of F is the
minimum integer T over all A computing F in time T .
A Monte Carlo algorithm may be one-sided or two-sided errors. For decision
problems, one-sided algorithms are classified as either false-biased or true-biased. A
true-biased algorithm is always correct when it returns true; a false-biased behaves
likewise. Two-sided errors algorithm has no bias: the answer (either true or false)
will be incorrect, or correct, with some bounded probability. This property (biased
algorithms) could be useful to reduce the error probability arbitrarily at the cost
of slight increase in running time (see Section 2.10.2).
For example, Grover’s algorithm always returns 0 when there is no x such that
F(x) = 1 whereas it returns 1 with probability better than (1 − 1/N) otherwise.
Simply put, “true” answers from the algorithm are certain to be correct whereas
“false” answers remain uncertain. This is said to be a (1−1/N)-correct true-biased
algorithm for unstructured search problems.
A randomized algorithm has worst-case success probability p if, for every prob-
lem instance, the algorithm returns a correct answer with probability at least p.
A randomized algorithm has average-case success probability p if, averaged over
all problem instances of a specified size, the probability that the algorithm returns
a correct answer is at least p [74].
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2.10.2 Probability Amplification
Monte Carlo algorithms are biased, which is a property that allows us to reduce the
error probability (for decision problems). This technique was called “amplification
of the stochastic advantage” [22]. However, we called it probability amplification to
make analogy with the quantum “amplitude amplification” (Section 2.12.3).
For a one-sided error algorithm, the failure probability can be reduced arbitrary
at slight increase of computing complexity by running the algorithm k times, thus
amplifying the success probability up to a desired constant that depends on k.
For a two-sided error and p-correct algorithm, provided that p > 1/2, the failure
probability may be reduced by running the algorithm k times and returning the
majority function of the answers.
2.10.3 Probabilistic Query Algorithm
A query algorithm computing a function F is one whose input x is given as an
oracle. A query typically sends an index i at a time and receives the element xi. An
algorithm computing in this model is adaptive, meaning that the kth query depends
on its total history (answers to k−1 previous queries). A query algorithm, which is
measured in query complexity, may be deterministic or probabilistic (randomized).
The query complexity of a function F is the minimum integer T over all algorithms
computing F with T queries.
A deterministic algorithm is one whose input deterministically controls its out-
put. We say that it computes F if its output equals F(x) for every x in the domain.
The complexity of F is taken over all algorithms computing F exactly.
A probabilistic (query) algorithm uses (typically uniformly-distributed) random
bits as a guide to its behaviour in the hope of achieving a better performance
than the deterministic one. An input x no longer determines the algorithm result
with certainty, which now becomes 0 or 1 with a certain probability. A randomized
algorithm computes F with bounded-error probability at most ε whenever its output
equals F(x) with probability at least 1− ε for every input x in the domain.
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2.11 Quantum Algorithmic Review
Based on several references [10, 31, 78], we specify the framework of quantum
algorithms, which differ form their classical counterparts. For quantum computing
in general, the reader is referred to textbooks of Kaye and Laflamme and Mosca [51],
and Nakahara and Ohmi [66]. As in the classical framework, our goal is to compute
some partial Boolean function F : RN → {0, 1} where the input is a finite N -tuple
x = x1x2 . . . xN given as a black-box. We take R = {0, 1} just for convenience.
2.11.1 Quantum Query Algorithm
A quantum query algorithm A that makes T queries is the quantum analogue to a
classical query algorithm with T queries, but now queries can be in superposition.
A T -query quantum algorithm A starts with the all-zero state |0 · · · 0〉, evolves
by applying a sequence of arbitrary unitary transformations U0, . . . , UT , alternated
with T queries Ox to the oracle x, followed by a measurement of the final state,
producing some classical outcome as a result of the computation. More formally,
for any T > 0 and an oracle x, the final state of a T -query A is denoted by
|ΦTx 〉 = UTOxUT−1Ox . . . U1OxU0|0 · · · 0〉,
which is then measured. The Ui’s are arbitrary unitary transformations that do not
depend on the input x while the oracle unitary transformations Ox are all equal
and depend on x.
To compute a function F, a quantum computer mainly uses three registers
|i〉|a〉|z〉. The register |i〉 is for the query index, the register |a〉 holds the query
answer, and |z〉 denotes an arbitrary fixed number of working qubits. The algo-
rithm A is working in the vector space H spanned by the basis vectors {|i〉|a〉|z〉}.
Assuming that m is the total number of qubits, each transformation acts on the m
qubits and there are 2m basis states for each stage of computation. For convenience,
the basis states are usually specified using natural numbers |0〉, |1〉, · · · , |2m − 1〉
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corresponding to their binary representations. Notice that |z〉 may consists of two
parts: qubits for reversible computation that are returned to their original state at
the end of the computation, and qubits holding the result of computation.
Any state |Φ〉 can be uniquely written as |Φ〉 = Σkαk|k〉 where k varies over all
basis states and the αk’s are complex numbers such that Σk|αk|2 = 1. Measuring
|Φ〉 in the above basis produces a classical result k with probability |αk|2. The
measurement operation is not reversible as opposed to unitary transformations.
Considering a binary oracle x, the index i has length dlogNe bits and the answer
a is one bit. By convention, the rightmost bit of the final state |ΦTx 〉 denotes the
output of computation after measurement. For computing non-Boolean functions,
the reader is referred to Ref. [2].
An algorithm A computes F with bounded-error probability at most ε if its
result equals F(x) with probability at least 1 − ε for every input x. The query
complexity of F is the minimum integer T over all (bounded-error) algorithms
computing F with T queries and error ε. Accordingly, the transformations Ui’s are
costless in terms of query complexity since they do not depend on the oracle.
2.11.2 Quantum Query Implementation
There are two natural ways of modelling a reversible query to an arbitrary Boolean
function f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}. The first way is
Ox|i, a, z〉 −→ |i, a⊕ xi, z〉
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or. Recall that |i〉 is an n-qubit register
while a is a 1-qubit register. We can extend this definition to allow a non-query
which can be obtained by setting either i = 0 or xi = 0.
The second way to implement a query is
Ox|i, z〉 −→ (−1)xi |i, z〉
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and we usually say that the oracle is “computed in the phases” by Ox. It is very
simple to invert the amplitude of exactly those states with f(i) = 1.
The two models are equivalent, but one may be more convenient depending
on the context. For instance, the second one is more convenient to prove lower
bounds [78]. For completeness, there is a reformulation of the first quantum
query, which is the key idea to establish the relation between quantum algorithms
and degrees of polynomials, allowing to prove lower bounds using the polynomial
method [10]. Formally, the third query implementation can be written as
Ox|i, a〉 −→ (1− xi)|i, a〉+ xi|i, a⊕ 1〉.
2.11.3 Quantum Random Access Memory
Nowadays, a quantum computer is imagined to be analogous to the successful
classical architecture, in the sense that it consists of two fundamental components:
a central processing unit (CPU) and a quantum random access memory (qRAM).
A simple qRAM may contain 2n memory cells (classical or quantum). Each cell is
uniquely identified by an integer 0 6 x 6 2n − 1, which is then called the address.
To access a cell x, its address is loaded into the address (or index) register, then the
content of the corresponding memory cell cx is provided in the data register. Unlike
a classical memory, if the index register is in a superposition of addresses, a qRAM
provides a superposition of pairs: (address, correlated data). We explain differently.
Let |0〉a and |0〉d denote, respectively, the address and data registers, set to zero
initially. If the input in a superposition of states
∑2n−1
x=0 αx|x〉a|0〉d , we obtain the
entangled output state
∑2n−1
x=0 αx|x〉a|cx〉d. Therefore, with one addressing process
we have access to an exponential amount of data, contrasting with the classical
memory that returns the content of only one memory cell at a time.
Such a memory is the main factor of improvements (in query complexity) of
several important quantum algorithms [4, 20, 25] over their classical counterparts.
Actually, these algorithms presume that this huge amount of memory contents can
be loaded in at most linear time.
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Unfortunately, there are still technological issues regarding the implementation
of such architecture. More precisely, in a classical memory, one addressing process
allows to load the content of a single memory cell, activating only a linear number of
gates (that determine a single path). However, in a quantum computer, an address
register in a superposition entails activating an exponential number of gates (the
all possible paths), creating amongst others the coherence problem, which is a
serious technological challenge for quantum information processing. In fact, even
theoretical proposals are still unclear if they really solve the problem. This topic
is beyond the scope of our research. Readers are referred to papers of Giovannetti,
Lloyd and Maccone [43] or the recent paper of Hong, Xiang, Zhu, Jiang and Wu [47].
For this theoretical thesis, we assume that a qRAM as we defined is available.
In particular, we take into account the query complexity only.
2.12 Quantum Search Tools
A large number of problems can be reduced to search problems of the form “find
some value v in a set of possible inputs such that the statement f(v) is true”. Such
problems includes database search, sorting and attacking an encryption scheme.
For example, consider a cryptographic scenario where an eavesdropper has in-
tercepted matching pairs of plaintext and ciphertexts, and the goal is to find the
key that maps one into the other. This problem can be easily viewed as a search for
the secret key k for which the statement “k can decrypt all the given ciphertexts”
is true. This section is dedicated to briefly review fundamental quantum search
methods for structured and unstructured search problems.
An unstructured search problem is one where nothing is known about the struc-
ture of the search space or the statement f(v). Randomly testing the truth of f(v)
one by one is the optimal method. For instance, if f is a black-box function, then
inverting f(v) is an unstructured search problem.
However, in a structured search problem (e.g., searching an alphabetized list),
information about the search space or f can be exploited to provide faster search [69].
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2.12.1 Grover’s Algorithm
Consider an oracle function f : D → R and an image y ∈ R with the promise that
there exists one and only one x ∈ D such that f(x) = y. The problem is to find x,
which is then called a solution.
Classically (deterministically or probabilistically), there is no better strategy
than trying distinct inputs at random until an x is found such that f(x) = y. This
requires trying N/2 inputs on the average and N − 1 on the worst case. However,
Grover’s algorithm [46] solves this problem in
O(
√
N)
quantum queries to f with bounded-error probability 1/N . Actually, this error
probability can be reduced to zero [24]. Besides, Grover’s algorithm is not only
optimal [19, 20] but exactly optimal [39]. Therefore, it is provably more efficient
than any algorithm running on a classical computer for problems that can be
modelled as a black-box. Readers interested in more description and analysis of
this algorithm are refereed to references [20, 51, 55, 69].
2.12.2 Generalized Grover’s Algorithm
Here we review the algorithm for the generalized unstructured search problem. Let
f : D → R be a black-box function and Y ⊂ R be such that |Y | = t with t |R|.
The problem is to find any x such that f(x) ∈ Y , which is then called a solution.
Whether or not t is known, Boyer, Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp [20] solved this
problem by generalizing Grover’s algorithm. We are interested in problems where
the number of solutions is known; for convenience we refer to this algorithm as
BBHT’s algorithm (generalization) or simply BBHT.
All remain similar to Grover’s algorithm except for few necessary modifications.
Let t be the number of solutions, assumed to be known, and let θ be such that
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sin2 θ = t/N with |D| = N . Generalized Grover’s search provides a solution in
O(
√
N/t)
quantum evaluations of f with bounded-error probability at most t/N . This error
probability is vanishing whenever t  N , which is usually the case in practice.
Note that a variant of this algorithm allows us to find the correct answer with
certainty [24].
2.12.3 Amplitude Amplification
Consider a Boolean function f : X → {0, 1} that partitions a set X into two
sets of good and bad elements, where x is good if f(x) = 1 and bad otherwise.
Assume also that a quantum algorithmA such thatA|0〉 = Σx∈Xαx|x〉 is a quantum
superposition of all elements of X. Let p denote the probability that a good element
is produced if A|0〉 is measured.
If we repeat the process of running A, measuring the output, and using f
to check the validity of the result, we shall expect to repeat 1/p times on the
average before a solution is found. However, assuming algorithm A makes no
measurements, amplitude amplification is a process that allows to find a good x
after an expected number of applications of A, and its inverse A−1 in O(1/√p).
This process works whether or not the value of p is known ahead of time. The
value of p in the problems we consider is always known. Formally, we state the
following theorem due to Brassard, Høyer, Mosca, and Tapp [26].
Theorem 2.12.1 (Quadratic speedup with known p). Let A be any quantum algo-
rithm that uses no measurements, and let f : Z → {0, 1} be any Boolean function.
Given the initial success probability p > 0 of A, there exists a quantum algorithm
that finds a good solution with certainty using a number of applications of A and
A−1 which is in Θ(1/√p) in the worst case.
36
2.12.4 Quantum Walks on Johnson Graphs
Our optimal quantum attacks are modelled as quantum walks on different graphs.
We review in this section quantum walks on Johnson graphs, which was devised for
element distinctness by Ambainis [4], and in Section 2.12.5 the general framework.
Most of quantum walks material are closely based on Santha’s excellent survey [70].
A Johnson graph J(N, r) is an undirected graph whose vertices are the r-subsets
(of distinct elements) of [N ] and there is an edge between two nodes if and only
if they differ by exactly one element. Intuitively, we may think of “walking” from
one node to an adjacent node by dropping one element and replacing it by another.
The task is to find a specific k-subset of [N ]. The nodes that contain this subset
are called marked.
A random walk P on a Johnson graph can be quantized and the cost of the
resulting quantum algorithm can be written as a function of S, U and C. These are
the costs of preparing the state related to the stationary distribution (setup phase),
moving unitarily from one vertex to an adjacent vertex (update phase) defined by
the chain, and checking whether a vertex is marked (checking phase), respectively.
Theorem 2.12.2. [4] Let M be either empty, or the set of vertices that contain a
fixed subset of constant size k 6 r. Then there is a quantum algorithm that finds,
with high probability, the k-subset if M is not empty at an expected cost in the order
of
S +
1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U + C
)
,
where δ ∈ Θ(1
r
) is the eigenvalue gap of the symmetric walk on J(N, r) and
ε ∈ Ω( rk
Nk
) is the probability that a random node is marked.
Childs and Eisenberg [36] proved that this algorithm can be used beyond ele-
ment distinctness, and provided a much simpler analysis than that of Ambainis. It
can be used in any application that can be reduced to the subset-finding problem.
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2.12.5 Quantum Walks on Markov Chains
Szegedy [75] then Magniez, Nayak, Roland and Santha (MNRS) [59] gave a general
framework to derive quantum search algorithms from a large class of Markov chains.
Given a Markov chain P on a discrete space X, with |X| = N , and a subset of
marked elements M ⊆ X, the problem is to provide an upper bound on the number
of iterations to encounter an element from M for the first time. We identify a
Markov chain over state space X with its transition matrix P = (pxy) where pxy is
the probability of transition from state x to state y.
Random walks on a directed weighted graph G(V,E) can be modelled by a
Markov chain defined by the sequence of moves taken by a robot between vertices
of G. The vertices are the states of the chain, the place of the robot at a given
time step is the state of the process, and there is an edge (x, y) ∈ E if and only if
pxy > 0, in which case the weight of the edge (x, y) is defined by pxy. In a d-regular
graphs, the probability that the robot follows edge (x, y) is 1/d.
Thanks to Szegedy’s theorem [75], a random walk P on some graphs can be
quantized and the cost of the resulting quantum algorithm can be written as a
function of S, U and C defined in the previous section. Szegedy’s algorithm [75]
is the quantum analogue for the class of ergodic and symmetric Markov chains.
More precisely, it provides a framework for “constructing and characterizing the
behaviour of a quantum walk algorithm by specifying a classical random walk, and
analyzing its spectral gap and stationary distribution [58]”.
Theorem 2.12.3 (Szegedy [75]). Let P be an ergodic and symmetric Markov chain,
and let ε be a lower bound on |M ||X| whenever M is non-empty. Then there is a
quantum algorithm that determines with high probability if M is non-empty at a
cost in the order of
S +
1√
δε
(
U + C
)
,
where δ is the eigenvalue gap of the chain P .
Based on Szegedy’s result [75], Magniez, Nayak, Roland and Santha provided
a quantum algorithm (MNRS) [59] for ergodic and reversible Markov chains.
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Theorem 2.12.4 (MNRS [59]). Let P be an ergodic and reversible Markov chain,
and let ε > 0 be a lower bound on the probability that an element chosen from
the stationary distribution of P is marked whenever M is non-empty. Then, there
exists a quantum algorithm that finds, with high probability, an element of M , if
there is any, at a cost in the of order
S +
1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U + C
)
.
2.12.6 Random Walks for Testing Group Commutativity
Some of our cryptanalysis algorithms are modelled as quantum walks, inspired by
Magniez and Nayak’s algorithm for testing group commutativity [58], also analysed
using Szegedy’s or MNRS’s theorem [59, 75].
Consider a set X of N elements. The random walk takes place on an undirected
graph G(V,E) whose vertices are the r-tuples of distinct elements of X. Two
vertices u = (u1, . . . , ur) and v = (v1, . . . , vr) are connected if and only if v is
obtained from u by permuting two of its components (not necessarily distinct); or
replacing one of its components by an element from X (not in the node). The
stationary distribution is the uniform distribution since the graph is symmetric.
The eigenvalue gap δ ∈ Ω(1/(r log r)) while the probability ε ∈ Ω(r2/N2). From a
vertex u = (u1, . . . , ur), we define the following transitions:
– with probability 1/2, stay at u,
– with probability 1/2, pick i ∈ [r] and j ∈ X; if j = uk for some k ∈ [r], then
exchange ui and uk; otherwise, set ui = j.
2.12.7 Random Walks on Hamming Graphs
We will also provide quantum attacks based on quantum walks on Hamming graphs
due to Childs and Kothari [35] (see Section 6.3). A hamming graph H(X, r) has
vertex set Xr and there is an edge between two r-tuples if and only if they differ
only on one coordinate. The eigenvalue gap of this random walk is δ = Ω(1/r).
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2.13 Lower Bound Methods
The most successful techniques for proving lower bounds on quantum query com-
plexity are the polynomial method [10], the adversary method [3] and the general-
ized adversary method [81].
The polynomial method was given by Beals, Buhrman, Cleve, Mosca and de
Wolf [10]. The main idea is that any quantum algorithm computing some Boolean
function F produces a corresponding polynomial. In particular, if the algorithm
computes F with probability at least 1− ε, the polynomial approximates the func-
tion F to within ε at all points in the domain. Therefore, by proving a lower bound
on the degree of polynomials approximating F, we can derive a lower bound on the
number of queries the quantum algorithm needs to make.
The first quantum lower bound was given by Bennett, Bernstein, Brassard, and
Vazirani [19], which is known as the hybrid method. Using classical adversary
argument, this method and all its subsequent variants are based on one principle:
we transform the problem to distiguishing inputs instead of computing the function.
Consider an algorithm A that computes successfully some Boolean function F in
the oracle model, and two inputs x, y such that F(x) 6= F(y). Then A must be
able to distinguish between oracles x and y. More precisely, for a given problem an
adversary runs A on one input, then changes the input slightly so that the function
value changes but the algorithm cannot recognize this change unless it makes a large
number of queries. Therefore, deriving a good lower bound is reduced to identify
two inputs that are hard to distinguish.
The measure of distinguishability is the inner product. Initially, the inner prod-
uct is one since the computation starts in a fixed state, and the output quantum
states of A on x and y must be almost orthogonal. Therefore, upper-bounding the
change of the inner product (the reduced uncertainty) after a single query implies
a lower bound on the required number of queries.
Ambainis [3] generalized this method, which is known today as the unweighted
adversary method. It became a very successful technique, having provided tight
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lower bounds for several interesting problems. It starts with choosing a set of pairs,
as opposed to one single pair in the first method, that maps F to different values.
Then the lower bound is brought to some combinatorial properties of these pairs.
However, considering only the hardest inputs does not produce good lower
bounds for some problems, such as sorting and searching an ordered list for instance.
Høyer, Neerbek and Shi introduced the weighted adversary arguments to prove
tight bounds for these problems [79]. The idea is to assign weights that represent
the hardness (in terms of queries) of distinguishing each pair of inputs. For this
purpose, one defines the spectral adversary matrix.
Definition 2.13.1. A spectral adversary matrix for a fixed function F : S → T is
a real symmetric matrix Γ : S×S → R such that Γ[x, y] = 0 whenever F(x) = F(y).
There are different means to determine the progress an algorithm makes in or-
der to distinguish inputs, which led to formulations in terms of weight schemes
due to Ambainis and Zhang [7, 82], Kolmogorov complexity due to Laplante and
Magniez [54] and in terms of eigenvalues due to Barnum, Saks and Szegedy [9]. All
these formulations are based on the same technique: bound the difficulty of dis-
tinguishing inputs. Using the duality theory of semidefinite programming, Sˇpalek
and Szegedy [76] showed that all these formulations are equivalent.
The adversary method and all its versions have several inherent limitations. One
limitation in our context is that they are incapable to derive good lower bounds for
any problem subject to the certificate complexity barrier. This limitation states that
ADV(F) 6
√
C0(F)C1(F) for total functions [76, 82], where Cb(F ) is the b-certificate
complexity of F. However, ADV(F) 6 2
√
C1(F)N if the function is partial [76],
where N is the input size. The same shortcoming for the Kolmogorov complexity
method was proved by Laplante and Magniez [54]. Consequently, for a problem like
element distinctness, where one of the certificate complexities is constant, the best
bound which can be proven by the adversary method is Ω(
√
N). This contrasts
with the polynomial method, which enabled to prove a tight lower bound of Ω(N2/3)
for this problem [2].
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Informally, certificate complexity measures how many of the N boolean vari-
ables should be given values so that the function’s value is fixed.
Definition 2.13.2 (Certificate complexity). Let f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1} be a function
and C : S → {0, 1} be an assignment of values to some subset S of the N indices.
We say that C is consistent with x ∈ {0, 1}N whenever xi = C(i) for all i ∈ S. A
1-certificate for f is an assignment C such that f(x) = 1 whenever x is consistent
with C. The size of C is the cardinality of S. We similarly define a 0-certificate.
The certificate complexity Cx(f) of f on x is the size of the smallest f(x)-certificate
that is consistent with x. The certificate complexity C(f) of f is the maximum of
Cx(f) over all x. The 1-certificate complexity of f is the maximum of Cx(f) over
all x for which f(x) = 1.
For example, the certificate complexity of the OR function on (1, . . . , 0) is 1,
because the assignment x0 = 1 forces the OR to 1. The same holds for the other
x for which OR(x) = 1, so the 1-certificate is 1. On the other hand, the certificate
complexity on (0, . . . , 0) is N . Therefore, C(OR) = N .
A stronger version of the adversary method was given by Høyer, Lee and Sˇpalek.
Called negative (or generalized) adversary method, it is also known as ADV± [81].
This new method is always at least as good as the adversary method and can
break the certificate complexity barrier. Indeed, there is a monotone function f
for which ADV±(f) = Ω(ADV(f)1.098) [81] and Belovs [14] constructed an explicit
optimal (negative-weight) adversary matrix for element distinctness. On top of
that, the generalized adversary bound is tight for partial and total functions as
shown by Lee, Mittal, Reichardt, Sˇpalek and Szegedy showed [56]. We will see in
Chapter 4 how these results [56, 81] enable us to provide a security proof of our
protocols, after trying in vain several lower-bound techniques. Moreover, the new
method ADV± has all the advantages of the adversary method ADV, particularly:
it is a lower bound on the bounded-error quantum query complexity, and has a
very useful property with respect to function composition, which is actually the
corner stone of all our lower bound proofs.
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We now present a closer look at this new method and compare it with previous
adversary methods, using the setting of the spectral formulation of the adversary
method [9]. Before proceeding, following Refs. [80, 81], we recall briefly this spectral
formulation.
Let Q2(F) denote the two-sided bounded-error quantum query complexity of a
function F. For a real matrix M we use M > 0 to say its entries are nonnegative,
and ‖A‖ denotes the spectral norm of A (which is equal to its largest eigenvalue).
In the following, Di is the zero-one valued matrix defined by Di[x, y] = 1 if and only
if the bitsrings x and y differ in the i-th bit or, equivalently, Di[x, y] = 1 if xi 6= yi.
For two matrices A,B of the same size, the entrywise (or Hadamard) product is
the matrix denoted by A ◦B and defined by (A ◦B)[x, y] = A[x, y]B[x, y].
Suppose we want to determine the quantum query complexity of a function F.
First, we assign weights to pairs of inputs in order to bring out how hard it is (in
terms of number of queries) to distinguish these inputs apart from one another.
The adversary lower bound is the worst ratio of the spectral norm of this matrix,
which measures the overall progress necessary in order for the algorithm to be
correct, to the spectral norms of associated matrices, which measure the maximum
amount of progress that can be achieved by making a single query.
The spectral adversary method states that, for any F, the bounded-error query
complexity Q2(F) is lower-bounded by a quantity ADV(F) defined in terms of Γ.
Definition 2.13.3. Let Γ be an adversary matrix for a fixed function F : S → T .
The adversary bound of F using Γ is
ADV(F; Γ) = min
i
‖Γ‖
‖Γ ◦Di‖ .
The adversary bound of F is
ADV(F) = max
Γ>0
Γ6=0
ADV(F; Γ).
Theorem 2.13.4 (BSS03 [9]). For any function F, Q2(F) = Ω(ADV(F)).
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Definition 2.13.5. Let Γ be an adversary matrix for a fixed function F : S → T .
The adversary bound of F using Γ is
ADV±(F; Γ) = min
i
‖Γ‖
‖Γ ◦Di‖ .
The adversary bound of F is
ADV±(F) = max
Γ6=0
ADV±(F; Γ).
Theorem 2.13.6 (HLS07 [81]). For any function F, Q2(F) = Ω(ADV
±(F)).
We can see from the definitions that ADV±(F) > ADV(F) for any function F.
Indeed, while the definition of ADV restricts the maximization to matrices Γ whose
entries are nonnegative and real, the new bound ADV± removes this restriction.
The key idea to transmit is that finding a good lower bound is simply reduced to
picking a good adversary matrix Γ. However, finding such a good Γ is not obvious.
2.13.1 New Lower Bound Composition Theorem
The central technical part of our lower bounds consists in analyzing the complexity
of a function closely related to the hardness of breaking our key agreement pro-
tocols. Recall that X ′ denotes X ∪ {0}, where X is an arbitrary set of integers.
This function is obtained when composing a general problem (subset-finding) with
κ instances of a variant of the unstructured search problem.
Consider three integer parameters κ, η and k, and three functions f : [κ]→ [κ],
g : [κ]→ [η] and h : [κ]× [η]→ [κ]′ so that
h(i, j) =
 f(i) if j = g(i),0 otherwise .
The task is to find a unique k-subset of distinct non-zero elements which satisfy
some property (equality for instance), having access to a black-box function h only.
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More precisely, find non-zero elements i1, . . . , ik ∈ [κ] that would provide a solution
to the outer poblem if we were given direct access to f . This can be viewed as
searching among η possibilities for the sole nonzero h(i, ·) for each i and then
solving f on those elements.
It is more convenient to prove this lower bound for the related decision problem:
we are given a function h of the type above, but it is based on a function f that
either has a single k-subset, or none. The task is to decide which is the case.
Obviously, any algorithm that can solve the search problem with probability of
success at least p > 0 can be used to solve the decision problem with error bounded
by 1
2
− p
2
: run the search algorithm; if a k-tuple is found (and verified), output
“yes”, otherwise output either “yes” or “no” with equal probability after flipping
a fair coin. It follows that any lower bound on the bounded-error decision problem
applies equally well to the search problem.
We change the notation to adapt it to the standard usage in the field of quantum
query complexity. The function f : [κ]→ [κ] is represented by an element of [κ]κ.
This makes it possible to think of the decision version of this problem as a Boolean
function F : [κ]κ → {0, 1}. Given κ integers (z1, . . . , zκ) ∈ [κ]κ, or equivalently on
input f , the goal is to decide whether or not there is a k-subset providing a solution
to f by making as few queries as possible.
We compose F with κ instances of a promise version of a search problem, which
we call pSEARCH.
Definition 2.13.7. pSEARCH : P → A with P ⊆ (A′)η is a promise problem. On
input (a1, . . . , aη), the promise P is that all but one of the values are zero. The goal
is to find and output this nonzero value by making queries that take i as input and
return ai.
The composed function, with A = [κ], is denoted H. On input x ∈ P κ,
H(x) = F(pSEARCH(x1), . . . , pSEARCH(xκ)).
We can think of H as a two-level tree: the root being labelled by F and each
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of the κ leaves being labeled by pSEARCH. An input x to H can be thought of as
being comprised of κ parts, x = (x1, . . . , xκ). We evaluate H on x by first finding
the κ non-zero values, and then computing F on these κ values.
Since H is defined as the composition of F and pSEARCH, we would like to
apply a new composition theorem for the generalized adversary method [81], which
would say that if a function H = F ◦ Gκ, then ADV±(H) > ADV±(F) · ADV±(G).
Unfortunately, the composition theorems of Refs. [56, 81] require the inner (and
outer [81]) functions to be Boolean, which is not the case here for the inner function
pSEARCH. Since counter-examples can be found, we cannot hope to have a fully
general composition theorem in which the inner function would be an arbitrary
function. Nevertheless, we proved a new composition theorem with pSEARCH as
the inner function [29].
Theorem 2.13.8 (BHKKLS11 [29]). Let F : Aκ → B, pSEARCH : P → A with
P ⊆ (A′)η as described above, and H = F ◦ pSEARCHκ. Then
ADV±(H) > 2
pi
ADV±(F) · ADV±(pSEARCH).
The quantum query complexity of H is in Ω(κcη1/2) where c is a positive con-
stant.
Now the necessary condition on F can be easily seen. Indeed, the adversary
bounds of each of the involved functions are needed before invoking the theorem.
2.14 Proving Cryptographic Lower Bounds
While we always assume that security is maintained only against linear query Eave,
which has full access to any communicated message over a public authenticated
channel, we make no assumption on Eave’s strategy. Therefore, to prove that a
given protocol Π is secure requires proving a lower bound on the number of queries
needed by any eavesdropper attempting to break Π. In other word, we have to prove
that no linear query algorithm can break Π, except with vanishing probability.
46
However, the current state of complexity theory does not allow to solve such
cryptographic problem straightforwardly. The alternative strategy is to first prove
a lower bound on the difficulty to solve a related problem X, then prove that
the scheme Π is secure as long as X preserve the proven difficulty. This strategy
proceeds by devising a reduction (an argument by contradiction) which converts
any probabilistic linear query algorithm A able to break Π (with non-vanishing
probability) into an algorithm A′ able to solve the problem X more quickly than
what was proven. For a detailed application of this strategy, see Section 4.2.2.
Actually, we use this approach to prove the security of all our protocols.
For more detail about this approach can be found in the textbooks [44, 60, 74]
or papers [48, 49].
CHAPTER 3
MERKLE SCHEMES
In 1974, Merkle proposed the first solution [63] for the key agreement problem,
where the third party is not needed, and the notion of public-key cryptography [38]
as a project proposal in a graduate course on Computer Security (CS244) at the
University of California, Berkely.
He proved that the key pre-agreement requirement is unnecessary, by a method
which allows legitimate parties to establish a secret over a public authenticated
classical channel after a number of queries proportional to some parameter N ,
while any classical eavesdropper needs a number of queries proportional to N2 in
order to obtain their secret from the communicated messages. The only assumption
is the existence of “one-way encryption function” [63] of domain size N2.
The proposal was rejected by the professor but Merkle “kept working on the
idea”. Initially rejected, it was eventually published in 1978 by Communications of
the ACM [64]. Based on a concept called “puzzle”, Merkle’s published scheme [64]
was different from his original scheme in the unclassified document [63], which is
based on a variant of the birthday problem (see Section 2.8.6).
In the forthcoming sections, we describe Merkle’s (original) scheme [63], its
security analysis against a classical eavesdropper, and a quantum attack that makes
it useless from a security viewpoint. Although unconsidered in this work, Merkle’s
published scheme [64] is described for completeness later. We finish the chapter
by “Quantum Merkle Puzzles”, which was introduced by Brassard and Salvail as
a first attempt to recover Merkle’s scheme which collapses in a quantum world.
While Merkle puzzles is known to mean Merkle’s published scheme, unfortu-
nately, it has been used [8, 29] to indicate the original one. In this thesis, we will
consider only Merkle’s original scheme [63], referring to it simply Merkle’s scheme.
It is worth comparing these two schemes since they have several interesting
differences: (1) at the time of writing, there are no lower bound methods in the
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literature to find the complexity of the published scheme; (2) it is an open problem
whether this latter is optimal, in contrast with the original scheme [63], which is
provably optimal in the black-box model [8]; and (3) there is no known reduction
between them. On the other hand, these schemes also have similarities: (1) any
classical eavesdropper needs an amount of queries which increases quadratically in
the legitimate one before obtaining the secret; and (2) a quantum eavesdropper
can find the secret as easy as the key agreement process (up to constant factors).
3.1 In a Classical World
All parties in this section are restricted to use classical computers, the 1970’s world.
We first describe Merkle’s (original) scheme [63], afterwards the published one [64].
3.1.1 Merkle’s Original Scheme
We emphasize that Merkle’s unpublished scheme [63] is the only one we consider
in this work and refer to it simply Merkle’s scheme. Before the formal description,
we first present the scheme according to Merkle’s typewritten words [63].
Method: Guessing. Both sites guess at keywords. These guesses
are one-way encrypted, and transmitted to the other site. If
both sites should chance to guess at the same keyword, this
fact will be discovered when the encrypted versions are compared,
and this keyword will then be used to establish a communications
link.
Discussion: No, I am not joking. If the keyword space is of
size N, then the probability that both sites will guess at
a common keyword rapidly approaches one after the number of
guesses exceeds sqrt(N). Anyone listening in on the line must
examine all N possibilities.
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More formally, assume the existence of a random oracle function f : [N2]→ [Nk],
where the constant k is chosen large enough so that there is no collision in the image
of f , except with vanishing probability (see Section 5.3.4).
The “keywords” guessed at by “both sites” are random distinct points in the
domain of f. For more precision, let us describe the protocol at step i > 2, assuming
it is Alice’s turn to respond. Alice picks randomly a point ai ∈ [N2] and transmits
it encrypted, by the application of f , to Bob. Next, Bob picks a random point
bj ∈ [N2] and checks whether or not f(bi) ∈ Ya where Ya consists of the images
sent from Alice. If the answer is ‘yes’, then Bob sends back f(bi) to Alice, who
can learn bi using elementary search in her table containing all her random points
coupled with the corresponding images, and the value of bi will be their secret.
However, if the answer is ‘no’, then Bob proceeds exactly as Alice. Both sites
continue comparing and transmitting encrypted random points to each other until
they chance to guess on the same point.
Now, we ensure that the protocol is correct, that is, at the end of the execution
of the protocol, Alice and Bob would have a common secret key after O(N) queries.
Indeed, since there are N2 points in the domain of f, it is sufficient to do O(N)
random guesses at each site after which “both sites should chance to guess” at the
same point, which becomes their common secret key. Note that the probability
that both parties establish a secret after O(N) queries approaches one, which can
be proved using a simple probabilistic argument.
As for the security analysis, a classical eavesdropper who listens to the entire
conversation has no way to obtain the secret key than to invert f on that common
encrypted point, since f is given as a black-box. However, inverting f on any point
in the domain requires an expected Ω(N2) queries, since it requires trying on the
average half the points in the domain.
It was a major open question in classical cryptography to determine whether
this quadratic relation between the legitimate complexity and the eavesdropping
one is the best possible in the black-box model. In 1989, Impagliazzo and Rudich
showed that every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model in which
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Alice and Bob ask O(N) queries can be broken by an adversary asking O(N6 logN)
queries [49]. It took 35 years after Merkle’s invention before Barak and Mahmoody-
Ghidary proved that Merkle’s scheme is indeed optimal in a classical world [8].
They designed an O(N2)-query algorithm which can find the secret established by
any key agreement protocol in the random oracle model in which Alice and Bob
make O(N) queries.
3.1.2 Merkle’s Published Scheme
Eventually published in 1978 [64], this scheme has been known as Merkle Puzzles.
Be aware that this name is also assigned to the original scheme [8, 29]. The idea
is simple, and we describe it immediately following Ref. [23].
We asssume the existence of an encryption function f given as a black-box.
Formally, let f : K × M → C where K is the encryption keyspace, M is the
message space, and C is the ciphertext space. If k is a key and m is a message,
then c = fk(m) is the ciphertext. Decryption is the inverse of f on c, given k.
Symbolically, m = f−1k (c). We assume that both f and f
−1 can be computed in
unit time provided k is available. However, guessing the key k, given c and arbitrary
information about m, is only possible by exhaustive search on the keyspace. The
size of K is assumed to be N in order to solve any puzzle in O(N), but not faster.
Assume also that Alice and Bob agree on an arbitrary public value v, which is used
to verify whether or not a puzzle is solved, and should be of adequate size.
To create a puzzle Pi, for 1 6 i 6 N , choose randomly an encryption key ki, a
unique identifier IDi, and a secret value xi, then compute
Pi = fki(IDi, xi, v).
However, to solve a puzzle Pi, the optimal way is to try random distinct keys
k ∈ K until the finding of f−1k (Pi) = (IDi, xi, v) for the right value of v, since f is a
black-box encryption function. Note that identifying v is the only way to recognize
that a puzzle is solved.
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It is worth comparing with a cryptogram. A puzzle is simply a cryptogram
which is meant to be solved efficiently (in linear number of queries here) while
a cryptogram ideally cannot be decrypted efficiently. To achieve this objective
(prepare solvable puzzles), it is sufficient to restrict the keyspace to an adequate
size. The scheme might be described as follows:
1. Alice prepares, saves, and sends Bob N puzzles P1, P2, . . . , PN .
2. Bob selects one puzzle Pi for a randomly chosen i ∈ [N ], and solves it. The
solution allows him to get IDi and xi. Bob transmits back to Alice the value
of IDi to inform her of the puzzle he has solved.
3. Alice, having received IDi and using her saved puzzles, can know the puzzle
that was solved by Bob using an elementary search. Hence, she can find
efficiently the value xi, which becomes their common secret key.
3.1.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Merkle Schemes
Shortly after Merkle’s original scheme [63], Diffie and Hellman [38] have discov-
ered a method that makes the cryptanalytic computational complexity apparently
exponentially harder than the legitimate complexity. However, there is no proof
that the Diffie-Hellman public-key system is secure at all since it relies on the
conjectured difficulty of extracting discrete logarithms, an assumption doomed to
fail in a world ruled by the quantum theory. In contrast, Merkle’s approach offers
provable quadratic security against any possible classical attack in the black-box
model, that is, f cannot be inverted by any other means than exhaustive search.
The major disadvantage of Merkle’s scheme is that it provides no-better than
polynomial security. Even worse, quadratic security is the best possible in a clas-
sical world [8]. In a quantum world, it is the objective of this thesis to know the
extend to which we can push the security level, which is clarified in next chapters.
Next, we describe how Merkle’s method collapses completely if the eavesdrop-
per is equipped with a quantum computer, and review a partial solution to this
problem [23] by granting similar powers to legitimate communicating parties.
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3.2 In a Quantum World
From now on, we assume that the eavesdropper is always quantum, but legitimate
parties might make use of quantum computing features depending on the context.
3.2.1 Collapse of Merkle’s Scheme
While Merkle’s scheme provides provable quadratic security in the random oracle
model against any classical eavesdropper, it is broken in O(N) queries against a
quantum eavesdropper.
Indeed, here is a quantum attack applying directly Grover’s algorithm [46].
Assume that f(x) is the common encrypted point between Alice and Bob, and
that the random oracle function f can be computed in a superposition of inputs.
The eavesdropper would like to know the secret x.
The problem is reduced to an unstructured search problem where the search
space is of size N2 and there exists one and only one solution. The eavesdropping
strategy is to resort to Grover’s algorithm which can solve this problem after a
number of queries proportional to the square root of the domain size, which is
O(N) quantum queries, and this is optimal [19, 20]. Grover’s algorithm is reviewed
in Section 2.12. The same attack can be used to collapse the published scheme too.
3.2.2 Quantum Merkle Puzzles
“Quantum Merkle Puzzles” were introduced in 2008 by Brassard and Salvail [23]
as a first attempt to recover the security of Merkle’s scheme.
Their protocol, in which a quantum eavesdropper has query complexity Θ(N3/2),
is very similar to Merkle’s scheme except for the following modifications: 1) allow
Bob to make use of quantum computing; 2) increase the function domain size from
N2 to N3; and 3) use the BBHT generalisation of Grover’s algorithm.
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of f
and transmits them encrypted, by the application of the function f , to Bob.
Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} and Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N}.
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2. Bob’s task is to invert f on an arbitrary element in the set Y . He sorts the
elements of Y so that he can quickly determine, given any y, whether y ∈ Y .
Then, he defines the Boolean function φ : N3 → {0, 1} as follows:
φ(x) =
 1 if f(x) ∈ Y0 otherwise
The problem is then reduced to finding x for which φ(x) = 1. There are
exactly N solutions satisfying this condition, out of N3 points in the domain.
Using BBHT, he can find a solution in O(
√
N3/N) = O(N) quantum queries.
3. Bob sends back f(x) to Alice.
4. Alice, having kept her randomly chosen points, can efficiently find the value
of x using elementary classical search. This x will be their secret key.
We calculate the legitimate complexity. Alice asks exactly N classical queries
while Bob asks O(N) quantum queries, neglecting the running time for sorting and
binary search. Therefore, the legitimate query complexity is in O(N).
The quantum eavesdropper, however, is faced to invert f on a specific point,
which provably requires a number of queries proportional to the square root of
the number of points in its domain [20, 24]. Therefore, the quantum eavesdropper
needs
Ω(
√
N3 ) = Ω(N3/2)
quantum queries, which is more than what is required of the legitimate parties, yet
less than what was required of the classical eavesdropper.
The introduction of quantum computers seems to be for the advantage of the
eavesdroppers. Can we remedy this situation? Is any security possible at all
against a quantum eavesdropper if both legitimate parties are restricted to use
classical computers? The next chapters, in which we study these and other related
questions, will reveal counter-intuitive answers.
CHAPTER 4
QUANTUM PROTOCOLS AGAINST QUANTUM ADVERSARIES
Merkle’s scheme, which provides provably quadratic security against classical eaves-
droppers [8], has no security at all in a quantum world. Our notion of “security”
is defined in Section 2.7. Allowing Bob to be quantum, Brassard and Salvail [23]
provided a scheme in which a quantum eavesdropper needs Ω(
√
N3 ) = Ω(N3/2)
quantum queries [19, 20]. Subsequently, it remained open the following question:
Is Ω(N3/2) the optimal key agreement security in the random oracle model, when
legitimate parties make use of quantum computations?
Part of our contributions, this chapter consists of two novel provably secure
protocols that answer positively this question. Both protocols provide security of
Ω(N5/3), though they are based on two different but equivalent search problems.
Before presenting any of the protocols, we remind of the setting in this chapter.
Legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, are allowed to make quantum computations. In
the first protocol both parties are quantum while in the second one only Bob needs
to be quantum. In both cases, the eavesdropper is assumed to have unrestricted
quantum resources in addition to having full knowledge of any communicated mes-
sage on the unique classical authenticated channel. All parties have access to the
same random oracle and our measure of complexity is the query complexity. Note
finally that all our results are implicitly stated “up to logarithmic factors”.
4.1 The First Θ(N5/3) Quantum Protocol
We describe this novel protocol assuming the existence of two black-box functions
f : [N3]→ [Nk] and g : [N3]× [N3]→ [Nk′ ] that can be accessed in superposition
of inputs.
The constants k and k′ are chosen large enough so that neither f nor g has a
collision in their images (both functions are one-to-one), except with polynomially
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vanishing probability, or equivalently, with probability in o(1). This assumption
is satisfied whenever the range size is quadratically larger than the domain size,
taking into account the birthday problem (Section 2.8.6). Specifically, we take
k > 6 and k′ > 12, based on our calculations in Section 5.3.4. For simplicity, we
shall systematically disregard the possibility that such collisions might exist.
The reason for which we left the notion negligible, which is necessary in standard
cryptography, in favour of vanishing is explained in Section 5.3.1. In Section 2.2,
we explain the meaning of the notions random function or how to choose a function
at random. In Section 2.3, we define the (random) oracles.
The notion of black-box functions, which is fundamental to understand in this
work, is defined and explained in Section 2.4. For instance, the black-box function
f is selected at random from the set of all mappings from D = N3 into R = Nk.
It might be useful to think of it as a tuple y = (y1, · · · , yN3) of integers where each
integer was chosen independently and uniformly at random, that is, y ∈ [Nk]N3 .
In addition, for all 1 6 i 6 N3, this box outputs yi ∈ Nk on an input i ∈ [N3].
Note that a single binary random oracle (which “implements” a random func-
tion from the integers to {0, 1}) could be used to define both functions f and g
provided we disregard logarithmic factors in our analyses since O(logN) queries to
the random oracle would suffice to compute f or g on any single input. Indeed, to
specify function f for instance one needs N3 logNk bits. Think of the N3 points as
embedded in the oracle in a canonical form. Each image is represented by logNk
bits, and each query i ∈ [N3] for f requires logNk queries to its corresponding
binary oracle to construct the integer f(i) ∈ [Nk]. It is understood hereinafter
that all our results are implicitly stated “up to logarithmic factors”.
On the other hand, multiple oracles can be represented using a single oracle by
pre-pending a fixed bit-string to the beginning of each query. For instance queries
of the form “0i” and “1i” can be considered queries to two separate functions f
and g respectively.
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Protocol 1 (Quantum parties vs quantum adversaries).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of f
and transmits them encrypted, by querying the black-box function f , to Bob.
Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} be the set of random points, which is kept secret
by Alice, and let Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N} be the set of encrypted points sent
from Alice to Bob. Keep in mind that Alice knows both X and Y whereas Bob
and the eavesdropper have knowledge of Y only without querying the oracle f .
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y,
according to the following procedure. He sorts the elements of Y so that,
given any y, he can efficiently determine whether or not y ∈ Y . Then, he
defines the Boolean function φ : [N3]→ {0, 1} as follows:
φ(x) =
 1 if f(x) ∈ Y0 otherwise .
The problem is then reduced to finding a pre-image x for which φ(x) = 1.
There are exactly N solutions satisfying this condition, out of N3 points in
the domain of φ. Using generalized Grover’s algorithm (BBHT), Bob can
find a solution in O(
√
N3/N ) = O(N) quantum queries to function φ, or
equivalently to f , since each query to φ implies one and only one query to f .
He needs to repeat this procedure twice in order to get both x and x′. (A small
variation in function φ can be used the second time to make sure that x′ 6= x).
3. Bob sends back w = g(x, x′) to Alice such that x < x′.
4. Since Alice had kept her random secret set X, there are only N2 candidate
pairs (xi, xj) ∈ X ×X such that g(xi, xj) could equal w. Using Grover’s
algorithm, she can find Bob’s pair (x, x′) with O(
√
N2 ) = O(N) queries to
function g. The secret established by Alice and Bob is the pair (x, x′).
We first verify that the protocol is valid, in the sense that at the end of its
execution, Alice and Bob agree on a secret after a number of queries linear in N .
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Indeed, Alice makes N classical queries to f in Step 1 and O(N) quantum queries
to g in Step 4, whereas Bob makes O(N) quantum queries to f in Step 2 and a
single classical query to g in Step 3. If the protocol is constructed over a binary
random oracle, it will have to be called O(N logN) times since it takes O(logN)
binary queries to compute either function on any given input.
It is crucial to know that Bob, to find x ∈ X, does not choose y ∈ Y randomly
and inverts it afterwards, which would require Ω(
√
N3 ) and consequently make the
protocol invalid. Instead, he applies BBHT generalisation an appropriate number
of times in order to evolve the initial state, superposition of all possible inputs,
to a final state, very close to a superposition of all possible solutions. Then, he
measures the final state, producing a purely random image, according to the axioms
of quantum mechanics, coupled with its corresponding pre-image.
4.1.1 Quantum Attack
All the cryptanalytic attacks against this scheme, such as direct application of
Grover’s algorithm, generalized Grover’s algorithm, or even more sophisticated
attacks based on amplitude amplification [26], require of the eavesdropper Ω(N2)
quantum queries to functions f and/or g. These quantum search algorithms are
reviewed in Section 2.12.
However, a more powerful attack based on the recent paradigm of quantum
walks [5, 36, 59, 70, 75] allows the eavesdropper to learn Alice and Bob’s key (x, x′)
with an expected O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N) queries to g. Actually,
our attack combines Ambainis’ algorithm for element distinctness [4] with Magniez
and Nayak’s quantum walk algorithm for testing group commutativity [58].
To analyse the cost of our quantum algorithms, we will always apply the theorem
of Magniez, Nayak, Roland and Santha (MNRS) [59]. Actually, the same upper
bounds can also be obtained using Szegedy’s theorem [75]. Both theorems are
reviewed in Section 2.12.5.
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Theorem 4.1.1. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the pair (x, x′)
in Protocol 1 with O(N5/3
√
logN) expected quantum queries to functions f and g.
Proof. The attack was originally inspired by Ambainis’ quantum algorithm for
element distinctness [4], which can find the (single) pair (i, j) such that ξ(i) = ξ(j)
with O(N2/3) expected queries to a function ξ whose domain consists of N elements.
In a nutshell, we apply Ambainis’ algorithm for element distinctness with two
modifications: (1) instead of looking for i and j such that ξ(i) = ξ(j), we are
looking for x and x′ such that g(x, x′) = w; and (2) instead of being able to get
randomly chosen values in the image of ξ with a single query to oracle ξ per
value, we need to get random elements of X by applying BBHT on the list Y,
which requires O(
√
N3/N) = O(N) queries to oracle f per element. From the first
modification, it might be clear that this problem is a special case of the subset
finding problem [36] (see Section 2.8.3). The second modification explains why the
number of queries to f , compared to O(N2/3) queries to ξ for element distinctness,
will be multiplied by O(N). To determine the query complexity of our quantum
attack, we need to introduce few ingredients.
It turns out that the special structure of our problem (composition of functions)
prevents from implementing a quantum walk on Johnson graphs, which is used in
element distinctness algorithm or its generalization [4, 36]. Therefore, our eaves-
dropping algorithm is combined with a quantum walk algorithm for testing group
commutativity due to Magniez and Nayak [58].
We briefly introduce the random as well as the quantum walk on this graph.
Let X denote the set of elements whose images are sent by Alice. The random
walk takes place over a graph G(V,E) whose vertices are the r-tuples of distinct
elements of X and eigenvalue gap is δ ∈ Ω(1/r log r)—see Section 2.12.6 for a
review of the random walk on this graph. More precisely, each vertex u has the
form |u1u2 . . . ur〉 where ui ∈ X and ui 6= uj for all 1 6 i 6= j 6 r. The value of the
parameter r will be determined during the analysis of the algorithm. Two vertices,
u and v, are connected if and only if v is obtained from u by permuting two of its
components or replacing one of them by an element of X not in the node.
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The algorithm initially starts with a superposition state of all vertices u ∈ V ,
which can be done by preparing each ui in superposition. We are looking for a
vertex that contains the two elements x and x′ of X such that g(x, x′) = w, where
w is the value announced by Bob in Step 3 of the protocol.
To define the quantum walk on this graph, let HV be the Hilbert space whose
orthonormal basis states are the elements of V . We define a basis state |u〉 for
each u ∈ V . Since the walk takes place on the edges instead of vertices, the full
quantum state of the algorithm has the form |u〉⊗ |v〉 where u, v ∈ V . One step of
the quantum walk (which is actually two steps on the graph) is a product of two
unitary transformations on the space HV ⊗HV , which is in fact a subspace of the
algorithm’s space (as it might be clear in the setup phase later).
Thanks to the theorem of Szegedy [75] or MNRS [59], the random walk P on
this graph can be quantized. We need to know the eigenvalue gap δ = δ(P ) of the
random walk, and the fraction of marked vertices under the stationary distribution
denoted by ε. Afterwards, the cost of the resulting quantum algorithm can be
written as a function of the quantum costs S, U and C:
Setup cost S: corresponds to prepare the state
∑
u∈V
√
piu|u〉 ⊗ |0〉
where pi is the uniform distribution of P , and the all-zero state |0〉 belongs to V .
Equivalently, the cost S corresponds to finding r random distinct elements of X.
To find one such element, we apply BBHT’s algorithm, which takes O(N) queries
to f even to find an element of X guaranteed to be different from those already
in the initial vertex (provided k  N , which it will be). Therefore, S = O(rN)
quantum queries to f . Here are more details.
1. Prepare the following state:
|ψ1〉 =
 1√
N3
∑
u1∈[N3]
|u1〉
⊗
 1√
N3
∑
u2∈[N3]
|u2〉
⊗· · ·⊗
 1√
N3
∑
ur∈[N3]
|ur〉
 .
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It consists of r independent registers. Each register is prepared initially in
superposition state of all possible integers in [N3] without involving oracle
queries, which can be done by applying Hadamard gates on the all-zero state.
2. Produce the superposition state of the r!
(
N
r
)
possible vertices of the graph:
|ψ2〉 = 1√
N
∑
u1∈X
|u1〉⊗
(
1√
N − 1
u2 6=u1∑
u2∈X
|u2〉 · · · ⊗
(
1√
N − r
ur 6=ui;16i<r∑
ur∈X
|ur〉
))
.
To construct |ψ2〉, we proceed as follows. First, we produce a uniform superposition
of all elements u1 ∈ X by applying BBHT on the first register of |ψ1〉. Since we
know the exact number of solutions, which is N at this step, this state can be
produced with certainty in O(
√
N3/N = N) queries even in the worst case, thanks
to Theorem 2.12.1. Second, for each u1 being in superposition state, we produce
a superposition state of all u2 ∈ X such that u2 6= u1, by applying BBHT on
the second register with N − 1 as the number of solutions this time. We continue
similarly until the rth step in which, for each (r − 1)-tuple |u1u2 . . . ur−1〉, we
produce a uniform superposition state of elements ur ∈ X such that ur 6= ui for
1 6 i < r. This step can be achieved in O(
√
N3/N − r) = O(N) queries, since the
number of solutions is now N − r ≈ N .
Update cost U: corresponds to realize any of the following unitary transfor-
mations and their inverses:
U1 : |u〉 ⊗ |0〉 → |u〉 ⊗
(∑
v∈V
√
puv|v〉
)
,
U2 : |0〉 ⊗ |v〉 →
(∑
u∈V
√
pvu|u〉
)
⊗ |v〉.
The graph is symmetric, meaning that puv = pvu for all u, v ∈ V . Besides, the
distribution of the random walk is uniform: the probability of moving from |u, v〉
to |u, v′〉 is the same, for all u ∈ V and for all neighbouring vertices v′ 6= v.
Besides, the result of BBHT’s algorithm is a state of the N possible elements
of X with the same amplitude (uniform superposition), which is exactly what is
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needed to realize U1 and U2 (see definition of the random walk in Section 2.12.6).
Therefore, each application of either U1 or U2 invokes BBHT only once, thus taking
O(N) queries.
Checking cost C: corresponds (in this protocol) to the phase flip operation,
which is necessary to distinguish the marked r-tuple, that is, the unique vertex
containing the pair (x, x′) such that g(x, x′) = w. This unitary is defined as follows:
F |u〉 =
−|u〉 if x, x
′ ∈ u,
|u〉 otherwise.
This phase can be achieved using Grover’s algorithm. Since there are r2 possible
pairs of elements in the vertex, it can be done in O(
√
r2 ) = O(r) quantum queries
to g.
To analyse the cost of our quantum algorithm on this graph, we can apply
either Szegedy’s or MNRS’ theorem, since the chain is symmetric and reversible in
addition to be ergodic—see Section 2.12.5 for a review of this topic.
Be aware that our cryptanalysis algorithm runs over only one copy of the (basic)
quantum. Maniez and Nayak [58] used two independent simultaneous copies in
their original algorithm. However, the graph maintains the same mathematical
properties, specially δ ∈ Ω(1/r log r) and ε ∈ Ω(r2/N2).
It is worth mentioning how to calculate ε, which is the probability that a random
vertex is marked (contains a solution). A vertex is marked in this case if it contains
elements x, x′ such that g(x, x′) = w. Assume that such a pair exists and consider
a random r-tuple vertex u ∈ V . Then, the probability of u being marked is
Pr[x, x′ ∈ u] = Pr[x ∈ u] · Pr[x′ ∈ u|x ∈ u]
=
r
N
· r − 1
N − 1
≈ r
2
N2
Note that this result can also be obtained using the usual combinatorial method.
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Putting all the necessary ingredients together and using the MNRS theorem,
the expected cryptanalytic cost is in the order of:
S +
1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U + C
)
= S + N
r
(√
r log rU + C
)
=
(
rN queries to f
)
+ N
r
(√
r log r(N queries to f) + (r queries to g)
)
=
(
rN +
N2√
r
√
log r
)
queries to f and N queries to g .
To minimize the number of queries to f , we choose r so that rN = N2/
√
r,
which is r = N2/3. It follows that a quantum eavesdropper can find the key (x, x′)
with an expected O(N
2√
r
√
log r ) = O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N) queries
to g.
Note that the use of Grover’s algorithm in the checking phase was not necessary
to prove Theorem 4.1.1. Should this step be carried out classically, this would result
in C = O(r2) queries to g. Consequently, the expected cost to find the key would
become O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N · r) = O(N5/3) queries to g.
However, if we apply Szegedy’s theorem, then the cost becomes in the order of:
S +
1√
δε
(
U + C
)
=
(
rN queries to f
)
+
N
r
√
r log r
(
N queries to f + r call to g
)
=
(
rN +
N2√
r
√
log r
)
queries to f and
(
N
√
r log r
)
queries to g .
To minimize the number of queries to f and g, we choose r = N2/3. It follows
that the total cost is O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N4/3
√
logN) queries to g.
Clearly, this algorithm requires more queries to function g. Note also that Szegedy’s
algorithm can determine rather than find a solution.
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4.1.2 Lower Bound
We prove in this section that the preceding quantum attack against our quantum
protocol is optimal, (up to the square-root of a logarithmic factor), by this theorem.
Theorem 4.1.2 (Eavesdropping lower bound). Any eavesdropping strategy A that
learns the key (x, x′) in Protocol 1 requires a total of Ω(N5/3) quantum queries to
functions f and g. Any strategy A asking o(N5/3) queries can find the key only
with o(1) probability over the random views of the protocol.
The proof of Theorem 4.1.2 consists of four steps:
1. We define a composed search problem H related to the hardness of breaking
our protocol;
2. We prove a lower bound on the difficulty to solve H (Lemma 1), using a
new composition theorem for the generalized adversary method [29], which
is reviewed in Section 2.13.1;
3. We reduce H to a less structured problem H′ (Lemma 2), giving the same
desired lower bound; and
4. We reduce the problem H′ to the eavesdropping problem against our protocol.
More precisely, we show that any attack on our key agreement scheme that
would have a non-vanishing probability of success after o(N5/3) queries to
functions f and/or g could be turned into an algorithm capable of solving H′
more efficiently than possible.
In Step 1, we compose the element distinctness problem (ED) with N instances
of a search problem with a promise (pSEARCH), which results in the starting search
problem H = ED ◦ pSEARCHN . We first recall of these problems or their variants.
Consider an oracle function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] such that there exists a pair (i, j),
1 6 i < j 6 N , for which ξ(i) = ξ(j). Ambainis’ quantum algorithm for element
distinctness [4] or its generalization [36] (Section 2.12.4) can find this pair with
O(N2/3) queries to function ξ and Aaronson and Shi proved that this is optimal
even for the decision version of this problem [2].
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Consider the promise problem pSEARCH : P → [M ] with P ⊆ ([M ]′)N2 . Recall
that [M ]′ denotes {0} ∪ [M ]. On input (a1, . . . , aN2), the promise P is that all but
one of the values are zero. The goal is to find and output this nonzero value by
making queries that return ai on input i.
The structure of problem H allows us to think of it as a two-level tree: the root
being labelled by ED (or SF) and each of the κ leaves being labeled by pSEARCH.
An input x ∈ PN to H can be thought of as being N parts, x = (x1, . . . , xN). We
evaluate H on x by first finding the N non-zero values, and then computing ED on
those values. More formally, on input x ∈ PN ,
H(x) = ED(pSEARCH(x1), . . . , pSEARCH(xN)).
Consider now a function h : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′. The domain of this function is
composed of N “buckets” of size N2, where h(i, ·) corresponds to the ith bucket
for 1 6 i 6 N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one single
random xi ∈ [N2] for which h(i, xi) = ξ(i). Symbolically,
h(i, j) =
 ξ(i) if j = xi0 otherwise .
It follows from the definitions of ξ and h that there is a single pair of distinct
elements a and b in the domain of h such that h(a) = h(b) 6= 0. How difficult is
it to find this pair given an oracle access for function h but no direct access to ξ?
We answer this question by the following lemma, achieving the second step of the
proof.
Lemma 1 (Lower bound for h). Given h structured as above, finding the pair of
distinct elements a and b in the domain of h such that h(a) = h(b) 6= 0 requires
Ω(N5/3) quantum queries to h. Any algorithm A making o(N5/3) queries solves
this problem only with o(1) probability over the randomness of considered oracles.
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Proof. The search problem can be modelled as the composition of element distinct-
ness across buckets, the outer function, with finding the single non-zero entry in
each bucket, the inner function. In other words, it is a problem of searching among
N2 possibilities for the unique non-zero h(i, ·) for each i, and then finding two of
those N elements that are equal.
One would like to apply a composition theorem for the generalized adversary
method, which would give that the quantum query complexity of h is the product
of the quantum query complexities of the outer function and the inner function, or
symbolically, Q2(h) = Ω(N
2/3
√
N2 ). Høyer, Lee, and Sˇpalek [81] proved the first
composition theorem, which requires not only the inner function to be Boolean but
also the outer one. This limitation was partially removed by Lee, Mittal, Reichard,
Sˇpalek, and Szegedy [56] whose theorem requires only the inner function to be
Boolean. Unfortunately, both composition theorems require the inner function to
be Boolean, which is not the case here for pSEARCH. Trying to make the inner
function Boolean violates some conditions of these theorems. Therefore, we use a
new composition theorem [29] based on similar techniques (see Section 2.13.1). In
particular, the problem becomes a special case of technical Theorem 2.13.8 with
parameters κ = N (the number of buckets) and η = N2 (the size of the buckets).
Using Theorem 2.13.6 along with the quantum query complexities for element
distinctness and pSEARCH, it follows that finding the desired pair (a, b) requires
Ω(κ2/3η1/2) = Ω(N2/3
√
N2 ) = Ω(N5/3)
quantum queries to h.
Be aware that, in order to apply the composition theorem, it is necessary to
know the adversary bounds of problems under consideration. However, this is not
the case for element distinctness whose lower bound was found by the polynomial
method [10]. A recent theorem of Ref. [56] shows that the generalized adversary
bound is tight for total and partial functions. Therefore, we may conclude that
there exists an Ω(κ2/3) adversary bound for element distinctness.
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For Step 3, consider a slightly less structured search problem in which there are
no longer buckets, but there is an added coordinate in the image of the function:
h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′
We justify the added coordinate [N ]′ in the last step of the proof where it
turns out to be necessary. Define this function such that h′(a) = (0, 0) on all
but N randomly chosen points denoted by w1, w2,. . . , wN . On these N points,
h′(wi) = (i, ξ(i)), where ξ is the function for element distinctness considered at the
beginning of Step 1. We are required to find the unique pair of distinct a and b in
[N3] such that pi2(h
′(a)) = pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0, where “pi2 ” denotes the projection on the
second coordinate. Similarly, “pi1 ” denotes the projection on the first coordinate.
The lower bound on the earlier search problem concerning h implies directly the
same lower bound on the new search problem concerning h′ since any algorithm
capable of solving the new problem can be used at the same cost to solve the
earlier problem through randomization and some technical adjustment. In other
words, the more structured version of the problem cannot be harder than the less
structured one. The next lemma formalizes this argument.
Lemma 2 (Lower bound for h′). Given h′ structured as above, finding the pair of
distinct preimages a and b of h′ such that pi2(h′(a)) = pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0 requires Ω(N5/3)
quantum queries to h′.
Proof. Define intermediary function h˜ : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′ × [M ]′ by
h˜(i, j) =
 (i, h(i, j)) = (i, ξ(i)) if h(i, j) 6= 0(0, h(i, j)) = (0, 0) otherwise .
It is elementary to reduce the search problem concerning h to the one concerning h˜
as well as the search problem concerning h˜ to the one concerning h′. (However,
we describe it briefly for completeness when presenting Protocol 2.) Therefore, the
lower bound concerning h given by Lemma 1 applies mutatis mutandis to h′.
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Finally, it remains to finish the last step of Theorem 4.1.2, which is to reduce the
search problem concerning h′ to the cryptanalytic difficulty against our protocol.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.2. Consider any eavesdropping strategy A that listens to the
communication between Alice and Bob and tries to determine the key (x, x′) by
querying black-box functions f and g. In fact, there are no Alice and Bob here.
Instead, there is an oracle function h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′ as described before, for
which we want to solve the search problem by using unsuspecting A as a resource.
In other words, given access to h′ only, we have to simulate for A an environment
identical to a random view of the protocol, except with vanishing probability. The
main idea is to supply A with a completely fake “conversation” between “Alice”
and “Bob” as follows.
For sufficiently large k and k′, we choose at random N points y1, y2,. . . , yN
in [Nk] and one point w ∈ [Nk′ ], and we pretend that Alice has sent the yi’s to
Bob and that Bob has responded with w. Let Yˆ denote the subset containing the
points y1, y2,. . . , yN . In addition, we choose random functions fˆ : [N
3]→ [Nk]
and gˆ : [N3]× [N3]→ [Nk′ ]. Note that the selection of fˆ and gˆ may take a lot of
time, but this does not count towards the number of queries that will be made to
function h′, and our lower bound on the search problem concerns only this number
of queries. We may prefer to choose randomly values of fˆ and gˆ one by one (dynamic
viewpoint that is usually used in the case of classical cryptography), which is not
possible for the following reason. In quantum algorithms, queries are usually asked
in superposition of all possible inputs; in order to create interference. Therefore,
the function specification must be available before starting the reduction. The final
thing that we need to make the reduction is a random Boolean s ∈ {true, false}.
The Boolean s indicates, when true (resp. false), that the fake “execution” is such
that “Bob” has first picked x and then x′ such that x < x′ (resp. x′ > x). Both cases
happen with probability 1/2 in any real execution and for any public announcements
Y and w. The value s will be used in the reduction to distinguish between g(x, x′)
and g(x′, x) so that only g(x, x′) will be set to w.
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The reduction A′, which uses A as a subroutine, is derived as follows
We wait for A’s queries to f and g.
– When A asks for f(i) for some i ∈ [N3], there are two possibilities:
– If h′(i) = (0, 0), return fˆ(i) to A as value for f(i).
– Otherwise, return ypi1(h′(i)) .
– When A asks for g(i, j) for some i, j ∈ [N3], there are again two possibilities:
– If pi2(h
′(i)) = pi2(h′(j)) 6= 0 and either s is true and i < j or s is false and
i > j, return w as value for g(i, j).
– Otherwise, return gˆ(i, j).
At this stage, it is convenient to explain the utility of the left-hand component
in the image of h′. For each h′(i) 6= (0, 0), the algorithm A should get one of
the points of Yˆ ; generated at the beginning of this “artificial” cryptanalytic task.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the yi’s and the non-zero values in
the image of h. Without the added coordinate, we would use the value h′(i) = ξ(i)
as index to return the corresponding point yξ(i), and concequently, A would get at
some time the same point yξ(i) for two distinct elements i, j whenever ξ(i) = ξ(j).
The reduction becomes inconsistent with the real-world execution of the protocol.
In contrast, adding this component, which takes values in [N ]′, guarantees to have
N indices form 1 to N in addition to the 0 value, which enables us to access any yi
consistently with the real world. This solves this problem as shown in the reduction.
If A was classical, one would simply solve this problem using a table that keeps
track of any h′(i) 6= (0, 0). However, maintaining such a process in the quantum
case seems to be difficult or probably impossible.
When selecting Yˆ = {y1, . . . , yN} from [Nk] and fˆ : [N3]→ [Nk], it may happen
that there is a specific yi that is also an image of fˆ on some input, making the reduc-
tion inconsistent with the real world execution. However, this event happens with
probability smaller than N ·N3/Nk = N4/Nk, which vanishes super-quadratically
since k > 6. Provided that there is neither collision in Yˆ nor in fˆ , this bound can
be easily obtained when we think of this event as a birthday problem between two
subsets: Yˆ and N3 random points in Nk (see Section 5.3.4).
69
Suppose now that A correctly returns the pair (i, j) for which it was told that
g(i, j) = w, which is what a successful eavesdropper is supposed to accomplish.
This pair is in fact the answer to the search problem concerning h′ since g(i, j) = w
implies that pi2(h
′(i)) = pi2(h′(j)) 6= 0, except with the vanishing probability that
gˆ(i′, j′) = w for some query (i′, j′) that A asks about g. This event happens with
vanishing probability N6/Nk
′
since k′ > 12, considering the birthday problem
between two subsets having cardinalities 1 and N6. In fact, we always assume that
the function range size is at least quadratically larger than the domain size.
Queries asked by A concerning f and g are answered in the same way as they
would be if f and g were two random functions consistent with the Y and w
announced by Alice and Bob during the execution of a real protocol. Indeed,
remember that Y (subset of [Nk]) and w (element of [Nk
′
]) are uniformly picked
at random in both the simulated and the real worlds. Moreover, the simulated
function f is such that f(i) is random when h′(i) = (0, 0). The remaining N
output values are in Y, as expected by A. On the other hand, the simulated
function g is random everywhere except for one single input pair (i, j), i 6= j for
which g(i, j) = w, as it is also expected by A. Therefore, A will behave in the
environment provided by the simulation exactly as in the real world. Since we
disregard the vanishing possibility that g might not be one-to-one, the reduction
solves the search problem concerning h′ whenever A succeeds in finding the key.
Notice that each (new) question asked by A to either f or g translates to one or
two questions actually asked to h′. This mainly happens when querying g(i, j) for
some positive integers i 6= j, which requires querying h(i) and h(j).
It follows that any successful cryptanalytic strategy that makes o(N5/3) total
queries to f and g would solve the search problem with only o(N5/3) queries to
function h′, which is impossible, except with vanishing probability. This establishes
the Ω(N5/3) lower bound on the cryptanalytic difficulty of breaking our protocol,
again except with vanishing probability over the random views of the protocol,
matching the upper bound (up to a logarithmic factor) provided in Section 4.1.1.
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4.2 The Second Θ(N5/3) Quantum Protocol
As the title indicates, the second quantum protocol is as secure as Protocol 1.
However, it has several new features that stem from using the ⊕ operation instead
of a random oracle at the third step, where “⊕ ” is the bitwise exclusive-or. We
mention here briefly these features but their interest will be clarified as we advance.
Using ⊕ will allow us to design more secure protocols than those based on
element distinctness (or subset-finding). More precisely, this will enable us to
generalize the classical as well as the quantum protocols, providing further more
improvements. Second, the security proof of those protocols will be exactly the
same as the one in this section. Third, in the quantum setting, Alice can remain
classical while preserving the same security level. It also results in the complexity
relationship between element distinctness and 2XOR, which is important in its own.
We now proceed with the second scheme.
Similarly to Protocol 1, we assume the existence of two random oracle functions
f : [N3]→ [Nk] and t : [N3]→ [Nk′ ] that can be accessed in quantum superposition
of inputs.
The constant k is chosen large enough so that f is one-to-one, except with
polynomially vanishing probability. But, the condition on k′ is slightly different.
It is chosen so large that t is one-to-one, and that t(a)⊕ t(b)⊕ t(c)⊕ t(d) 6= 0
whenever {a, b, c, d} contains at least three distinct elements in the domain of t,
except with vanishing probability. In other words, for any integer w, the event
t(a)⊕ t(b) = w and t(c)⊕ t(d) = w should only happen with vanishing probability.
Finding such a collision is equivalent to finding one in a function h : [N6]→ [Nk′ ].
Hence, the problem becomes a special case of Theorem 6.1.1. The probability of
this event is at most N12/Nk
′
, which vanishes for any k′ > 12. For simplicity,
we shall systematically disregard the possibility that such exceptions might occur.
Without delay, we describe our second protocol; the first two steps remain exactly
the same as in Protocol 1.
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Protocol 2 (Quantum parties vs quantum adversaries).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of f
and transmits them encrypted, by querying the black-box function f , to Bob.
Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} and Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N}.
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y.
To find each one of them, he uses generalized Grover’s algorithm, which finds
a solution in O(
√
N3/N ) = O(N) quantum queries to f .
3. Bob sends back w = t(x)⊕ t(x′) to Alice.
4. Alice queries the oracle t on her randomly chosen set X that she has kept.
There are only N2 candidate pairs (xi, xj) ∈ X ×X such that t(xi)⊕ t(xj)
could equal w. Therefore, she can find the unique pair (xi, xj) without any
additional queries. Alice and Bob’s secret is the pair (x, x′), assuming x < x′.
All counted, Alice makes exactly N classical queries to f in Step 1 and N
classical queries to t in Step 4, whereas Bob makes O(N) quantum queries to f in
Step 2 and two classical queries to t in Step 3. Therefore, legitimate parties make
a total of O(N) quantum and/or classical queries, thus the protocol is valid.
Note that our measure of complexity is the query complexity. However, if we
also care about time complexity, it seems at first that Alice needs to try about half
the N2 pairs. But, this can easily be done in linear time (see Section 6.4).
4.2.1 Quantum Attack
The same previous attack enables Eave to recover Alice and Bob’s key (x, x′) with
an expected O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N2/3
√
logN) queries to t, although
the property for which we are looking is different. This is the second manifestation
showing that Ambainis’ algorithm can indeed be used beyond element distinctness.
Theorem 4.2.1. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the pair (x, x′)
in Protocol 2 with O(N5/3
√
logN) expected quantum queries to functions f and t.
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Proof. An eavesdropper can set up a quantum walk similar to that in Section 4.1.1,
except that now (1) instead of looking for x and x′ such that g(x, x′) = w, we are
looking for x and x′ such that t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w where w is the value announced by
Bob in Step 3 of the protocol; and (2) instead of being able to get randomly chosen
values in the image of ξ with a single query per value, we need to get random
elements of X by applying BBHT on the list Y and queries the oracle t on them;
and (3) the algorithm maintains a data structure to store the values under t along
with the r-tuples.
We apply Theorem 2.12.4 to analyse the cost of quantum walk algorithm on
this graph. The set up cost S corresponds to finding r random elements of X using
BBHT, and querying t on them. Therefore, the setup cost is S = O(rN) queries
to f and r queries to t. The update cost corresponds to finding one random element
of X not already in the node and querying t on it, which is U = O(N) queries to f
and one query to t. The checking cost C requires us to decide if there is a pair
(x, x′) of elements in the node such that t(x)⊕ t(x′) = w, which is done without
any additional queries because the values under t are already in the vertex (data
structure) and ⊕ is used instead of an oracle. Therefore, the checking cost C = 0,
contrasting with that of Section 4.1.1, which requires O(r) queries.
Putting all necessary ingredients together and applying the MNRS’s theorem,
the expected cryptanalytic cost is in the order of:
S +
1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U + C
)
= S + N
r
(√
r log rU
)
=
(
rN +
N2√
r
√
log r
)
queries to f and
(
r +
N√
r
√
log r
)
queries to t .
To optimize the number of queries to f and t, we choose r so that rN = N2/
√
r,
implying r = N2/3. It follows that a quantum eavesdropper can find the key (x, x′)
with an expected O(N5/3
√
logN) queries to f and O(N2/3
√
logN) queries to t.
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4.2.2 Lower Bound
The impossibility of finding the key (x, x′) with fewer than Ω(N5/3) queries to f
and/or g, except with vanishing probability, is formalized by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Eavesdropping lower bound). Any eavesdropping strategy A that
knows of the secret key (x, x′) in Protocol 2 requires a total of Ω(N5/3) quantum
queries to functions f and t. Besides, any strategy A asking o(N5/3) queries can
find this secret key only with o(1) probability over the random views of the protocol.
The proof of this theorem is also a four-step procedure that follows the same
lines as the lower-bound proof in Section 4.1.2 with several modifications. The main
change is that in the first step we compose the 2XOR problem, instead of element
distinctness, with N instances of problem pSEARCH, thus defining a search problem
H = 2XOR◦pSEARCHN related to the hardness of breaking our protocol. The other
three steps remain the same, except for technical adjustments taking into account
2XOR. However, there is only one new ingredient. We prove the optimal lower
bound of 2XOR, see Section 4.2.3. This step is necessary to invoke the composition
theorem as explained in Section 5.3.3.
For the first step, consider a function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] such that there exists a
(single) pair (i, j) with ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w and 1 6 i < j 6 N . The problem is to find
this pair, which is a variant of 2XOR (see Definition 2.8.9).
Ambainis’ algorithm for element distinctness [4] can find this pair with O(N2/3)
queries to function ξ. Besides, we reduce element distinctness to 2XOR. Therefore,
finding such pair (i, j) requires Θ(N2/3) quantum queries. The full proof of the
quantum query complexity of 2XOR is explained in Section 4.2.3.
Consider now a function h : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′. The domain of this function is
composed of N “buckets” of size N2, where h(i, ·) corresponds to the ith bucket,
1 6 i 6 N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one single random
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xi ∈ [N2] for which h(i, xi) = ξ(i):
h(i, j) =
 ξ(i) if j = xi0 otherwise .
It follows from the definitions of ξ and h that there is a single pair of distinct a
and b in the domain of h such that h(a)⊕ h(b) = w and h(a) 6= 0 and h(b) 6= 0.
How difficult is it to find this pair given a black-box function h but no direct access
to ξ?
Lemma 3 (Lower bound for h). Given h structured as above, finding the pair of
distinct elements a and b in the domain of h such that h(a)⊕ h(b) = w and h(a) 6= 0
and h(b) 6= 0 requires Ω(N5/3) quantum queries to h. Any strategy making o(N5/3)
queries solves this problem only with o(1) probability over the randomness of the
considered oracles.
Proof. The problem can be modelled as the composition of 2XOR across buckets
with finding the single non-zero entry in each bucket. More precisely, it is a problem
of searching among N2 possibilities for the single non-zero h(i, ·) for each i and then
finding two of those elements, among N possibilities, whose exclusive-or equals w.
For the same reason mentioned in the previous protocol, both composition
theorem [56, 81] are equally not applicable in our case because the inner function
is not Boolean. Therefore, we use the more general composition theorem [29] again.
In particular, this problem becomes a special case of technical Theorem 2.13.8 with
parameters κ = N (the number of buckets) and η = N2 (the size of the buckets).
Using Theorem 2.13.6, it follows that finding the desired pair (a, b) requires
Ω(κ2/3η1/2) = Ω(N2/3
√
N2 ) = Ω(N5/3)
quantum queries to h, except with vanishing probability.
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For Step 3, consider a slightly less structured search problem in which there are
no longer buckets, but again with an added coordinate in the image of the function:
h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′
There is also another justification of the added coordinate [N ]′ that we discuss in
the last step of the proof where it turns out to be necessary. This function is defined
such that h′(a) = (0, 0) on all but N randomly chosen points in its domain, namely
w1, w2,. . . , wN . On these N points, h
′(wi) = (i, ξ(i)), where ξ is the function for
2XOR considered at the beginning of the first step. We are required to find the
unique pair of distinct a and b in [N3] such that pi2(h
′(a))⊕ pi2(h′(b)) = w and
pi2(h
′(a)) 6= 0 and pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0.
Similarly to the argument in Section 4.1.2, the lower bound on the earlier search
problem concerning h implies directly the same lower bound on the new search
problem concerning h′. The next Lemma formalizes this argument.
Lemma 4 (Lower bound for h′). Given h′ structured as above, finding the pair of
distinct elements a and b in the domain of h′ such that pi2(h′(a))⊕ pi2(h′(b)) = w
and pi2(h
′(a)) 6= 0 and pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0 requires Ω(N5/3) quantum queries to h′, except
with vanishing probability over the considered oracles.
Proof. Define intermediary function h˜ : [N ]× [N2]→ [M ]′ × [M ]′ by
h˜(i, j) =
 (i, h(i, j)) = (i, ξ(i)) if h(i, j) 6= 0(0, h(i, j)) = (0, 0) otherwise .
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2 at this stage, we discuss now how to reduce the
search problem concerning h to the one concerning h˜ as well as the search problem
concerning h˜ to the one concerning h′.
For the first reduction let B be an algorithm that solves h˜ and derive an algo-
rithm B′ to compute h using B as subroutine, and oracle access to h but not h˜.
When B queries h˜(i, j) then algorithm B′ transforms an instance of h to an instance
76
of h˜ as follows:
– queries h(i, j)
– If h(i, j) = 0, return (0, 0) as value of h˜(i, j).
– Otherwise, return (i, h(i, j))) as value of h˜(i, j).
For the second reduction, we define algorithms B for h′ and B′ for h˜ similarly.
When B queries h′(k), then algorithm B′ is derived using oracle h˜ as follows:
– transforms k into (i, j) ∈ [N ]× [N2] using any canonical pairing function;
– If h˜(i, j) = (0, 0), return (0, 0) as value of h(k).
– Otherwise, return (i, h˜(i, j)) as value of h(k).
Therefore, the lower bound concerning h given by Lemma 9 applies mutatis
mutandis to h′.
Finally, it remains to achieve Step 4 of Theorem 4.2.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.2. Consider any eavesdropping strategy A that listens to the
communication between Alice and Bob and tries to determine the key (x, x′) by
querying black-box functions f and t. Using a function h′ : [N3]→ [N ]′ × [M ]′ as
described before, we want to simulate a random run of the protocol. Equivalently,
we want to solve the search problem by using unsuspecting A as a resource.
We supply A with a fake “conversation” between “Alice” and “Bob” as follows.
For sufficiently large k and k′, we choose randomly N points y1, y2,. . . , yN in [Nk]
and one point w ∈ [Nk′ ] and we pretend that Alice has sent the y’s to Bob and
that Bob has responded with w. We also choose random functions fˆ : [N3]→ [Nk]
and tˆ : [N3]→ [Nk′ ]. The selection of fˆ and tˆ may take a lot of time, but this does
not matter in query complexity (see Section 4.1.2).
Now, we wait for A’s queries to f and t. When A asks for some query i ∈ [N3],
there are two possibilities.
– If h′(i) = (0, 0), return fˆ(i) and tˆ(i) as values for f(i) and t(i), respectively.
– Otherwise, return ypi1(h′(i)) and pi2(h
′(i)) to A as values for f(i) and t(i),
respectively.
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Now, it is convenient to explain the utility of the left-hand coordinate in the
image of h′. Whenever h′(i) 6= (0, 0), the algorithm A should get one of the points
y1, y2,. . . , yN . Without the added coordinate, one would have a value ξ(i) in [M ]
which is usually bigger than N , and we don’t see for the time of writing how to
map it one-to-one to a value in [N ], which can be used as index for some y. If A
was classical, one would simply solve this problem using a table that keeps track
of any h′(i) 6= (0, 0).
Continuing the last step, suppose A returns correctly the pair (i, j) for which
it was told that t(i)⊕ t(j) = w. This pair is in fact the answer to the search
problem concerning h′ since t(i)⊕ t(j) = w implies that pi2(h′(a))⊕ pi2(h′(b)) = w
and pi2(h
′(a)) 6= 0 and pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0, except with the vanishing probability that
tˆ(i′)⊕ tˆ(j′) = w for some queries i′, j′ that A asks about t.
Queries asked by A concerning f and t are answered in the same way as they
would be if f and t were two random functions consistent with the Y and w
announced by Alice and Bob during the execution of a real protocol. Indeed, Y
(subset of [Nk]) and w (element of [Nk
′
]) are uniformly picked at random in both
the simulated and the real worlds. Moreover, the simulated function f is such that
f(i) is random when h′(i) = (0, 0). The remaining N values are in Y, as expected
by A. On the other hand, the simulated function t is random everywhere except for
one single input pair (i, j), i < j, for which tˆ(i)⊕ tˆ(j) = w, as also expected by A.
Therefore, A will behave in the environment provided by the simulation exactly
as in the real world. Since we disregard the vanishing possibility that t might not
be one-to-one, the reduction solves the search problem concerning h′ whenever A
succeeds in finding the key.
It follows that any successful cryptanalytic strategy that makes o(N5/3) total
queries to f and t would solve the search problem with only o(N5/3) queries to
function h′, which is impossible, except with vanishing probability.
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4.2.3 Quantum Query Complexity of 2XOR
We prove in this section the quantum query complexity of 2XOR, using the optimal
bound of element distinctness and some probabilistic reduction. The lower bound
of 2XOR is necessary to prove the security of our protocols. This result is important
in its own. To the best of our knowledge it was not known before.
Theorem 4.2.3. Consider a black-box function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ].
The problem is to find a pair (i, j), 1 6 i < j 6 N , for which ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w, or
return @ otherwise. Then, any bounded-error quantum query algorithm for the
(search variant of the) 2XOR problem must query the oracle function Θ(N2/3) times.
We proceed with the proof by first proving the upper bound, then its match-
ing lower bound, using two separate lemmas. For the purpose of these lemmas,
consider e : [N ]→ [M ] so that there (might) exist a pair (i, j), 1 6 i < j 6 N , for
which e(i) = e(j). Ambainis’ quantum algorithm for element distinctness [4] or
its generalization [36] can find such pair with O(N2/3) queries to function e and
Aaronson and Shi proved that this is optimal even for the decision version of this
problem [2]. In 2012, Belovs [13] proved the same lower bound using the negative
adversary method, giving explicitly the adversary matrix.
Lemma 5 (Upper bound). The element distinctness algorithm [4] or subset-finding
algorithm [36] solves the 2XOR problem in O(N2/3) queries to the input of size N .
Proof. We apply Ambainis’ algorithm [4] with one modification: instead of looking
for i and j such that e(i) = e(j), we are looking for i and j such that ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w,
which is the property when viewed as subset finding problem (see Section 2.8.3).
The algorithm uses quantum walks on a Johnson graph—see Sect. 2.12.4 for
a review of this topic. Each node of the graph contains some number r (to be
determined later) of distinct elements of [N ], in addition to their corresponding
images under ξ. We are looking for a vertex that contains the pair (i, j) such that
ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w.
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We apply Theorem 2.12.2 to analyse the cost of a quantum walk on this graph.
The set up cost S corresponds to querying ξ on r random elements in [N ], which is
S = r queries, since we get each random value in the image of ξ with a single query.
The update cost U corresponds to adding one random image of ξ not already in
the node, thus U = 1 query. The checking cost C requires us to check if there is
a pair (i, j) of elements in the node such that ξ(i)⊕ ξ(j) = w, which can be done
without any additional queries, since all necessary information are already in the
node, thus C = 0.
Putting it all together, the expected cryptanalytic cost is in the order of
S +
(
N
r
(
√
rU + C)
)
= S +
(
N
r
(
√
rU)
)
=
(
r + N√
r
)
queries to ξ
To minimize the number of queries to ξ, we choose r so that r = N/
√
r, which
is r = N2/3. It follows that a quantum algorithm is able to find the pair (i, j) with
an expected O(N2/3) queries to ξ.
Lemma 6 (Lower bound). There exists a probabilistic reduction from element
distinctness to 2XOR.
Before proceeding with the lemma, we make the following important reminder.
Aaronson and Shi proved the optimal lower bound of element distinctness using
the polynomial method, specifically when the range M of function e is such that
M > 3N/2. However, the lower bound becomes Ω(N1/2) queries whenever M = N .
Fortunately, Ambainis [6] proved that any symmetric problem defined on some
function e : [N ]→ [M ], its polynomial degree is the same for any M > N . More
precisley, the quantum query lower bound of a symmetric function of a large range
M , which is proved using the polynomial method, implies immediately the same
lower bound for any M > N . A function is symmetric if the output of the algorithm
computing it remains the same even if we permute its input and/or its output.
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Fortunately, element distinctness and 2XOR are symmetric. Therefore, their query
complexities remain the same for any M satisfying M > N . Now, it is time to
reduce element distinctness to 2XOR.
Proof. We prove that any algorithm that would solve 2XOR could be turned into
one to solve element distinctness. For this purpose, let A be an algorithm for 2XOR
and derive an algorithm A′ for element distinctness.
Given a uniformly w ∈ [M ] and an oracle e for element distinctness; we may
assume that w is always at position 0 of the oracle. The reduction A′ will proceed
as follows:
– choose randomly N/2 inputs of function e.
– on query i ∈ [N ], return e(i)⊕w if i belongs to those inputs and e(i) otherwise.
– when running A on the modified oracle, output the pair (i, j) if it is found
and verified, otherwise ⊥ .
Each run of algorithm A would output the correct result with probability 1/2
since w will be added to either e(i) or e(j) with probability 1/2. However, the
error probability can be made arbitrarily small by running A a constant number of
times. More precisely, run the algorithm m times. If a pair (i, j) is found, then the
answer is always correct, otherwise the answer is correct with probability at least
1− 1/2m; classical probabilistic algorithms are reviewed in Section 2.10.
Therefore, 2XOR requires Θ(N2/3) quantum queries because we have just proved
an Ω(N2/3) lower bound matching the previous upper bound.
Note that the same proof goes through for the decision version of this problem.
CHAPTER 5
CLASSICAL PROTOCOLS AGAINST QUANTUM ADVERSARIES
We revert in this chapter to the original setting considered by Merkle in the sense
that Alice and Bob are now restricted to use classical computers. Keep in mind
that their unique channel of communication is classical, thus ruling out the benefit
of any quantum communication. On the opposite side, an eavesdropper Eave is
assumed to know of all the communicated messages on the public authenticated
channel, and have access to unrestricted quantum computation resources. We refer
to this adversarial scenario as the classical setting.
In a classical world where no quantum theory is mindful of, it is necessary
and sufficient for any eavesdropper to ask Θ(N2) queries in order to know the key
established using Merkle’s scheme while legitimate parties make O(N) queries. In
a quantum world, however, there is a quantum attack resorting directly to Grover’s
algorithm [46] that enables to learn the secret key in O(N) queries, hence making
this scheme useless from security standpoint. This naturally raises the following
question: Is any security possible at all in the classical setting?
The most difficult part of this question was to decide which direction to take. In
addition, the intuition inspired from classical results was misleading after Barak and
Mahmoudy-Ghidari [8] proved that every key agreement protocol in the random
oracle model in which legitimate parties make O(N) queries can be broken in O(N2)
queries. Indeed, considering this latter and the quadratic speed-up provided by
Grover’s algorithm in several problems, it becomes tempting to think that every key
agreement protocol in the random oracle model can be broken in O(N) quantum
queries. We prove in this chapter that this intuition is wrong by exhibiting the
first classical protocol provably secure against quantum adversaries, thus closing
the above open problem and opening the question: Can we do better? Besides, we
answer positively this latter question by giving a more secure protocol.
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5.1 The Θ(N13/12) Classical Protocol
Compare with our quantum protocol described in Chapter 4. First, the considered
random functions f and g are now defined on a smaller domain to compensate
for the fact that classical Alice and Bob cannot use Grover’s algorithm anymore.
Specifically, we choose f : [N2]→ [Nk] and g : [N2] × [N2] → [Nk′ ] again with
sufficiently large k and k′ so that they are one-to-one (no collisions in their images),
except with polynomially vanishing probability. Taking into account the birthday
problem (see Section 2.8.6), this condition is satisfied whenever the range size is
quadratically more than the domain size, that is, for any k > 4 and any k′ > 8
as calculated in Section 5.3.4. Unambiguously, k and k′ are independent from
those in the previous chapter. Please refer to Section 5.3.1 to see why we use
the notion vanishing instead of negligible. The second difference is that Bob finds
the elements using a classical probabilistic algorithm stemmed from the birthday
problem instead of using Grover’s search, which cannot be used in this setting.
Third, only the first step remains the same. In fact, this step is unchanged in all
protocols throughout this work.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, we consider the query complexity : In
our analyses of efficiency and lower bounds, we count only the number of queries
to black-box functions or, equivalently, to the underlying binary random oracle.
From the latter, all our results are implicitly stated up to logarithmic factors.
Protocol 3 (Classical parties vs quantum adversaries).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of f
and transmits them encrypted, by querying the black-box function f , to Bob.
Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N} be Alice’s secret, and Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N} be
the corresponding set of encrypted points.
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y.
To find each one of them, he chooses random distinct values in [N2] and
queries f on them until one is found whose image is in Y. He is expected to
succeed with probability almost one in O(N2/N ) = O(N) queries to oracle f .
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3. Bob sends back w = g(x, x′) to Alice such that x < x′. In addition, he chooses√
N − 2 random elements from Y \ {f(x), f(x′)} and he forms a set Y ′ of
cardinality
√
N by adding f(x) and f(x′) to those elements. He sends the
elements of Y ′ to Alice in increasing order of values.
4. Because Alice had kept her randomly chosen set X, she knows the preimages
of each element of Y ′. Let X ′ denote {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ Y ′}. By exhaustive
search over all pairs of elements of X ′, Alice can find the unique pair (x, x′)
such that g(x, x′) = w. The key established by Alice and Bob is the pair (x, x′).
We analyze the query complexity of Alice and Bob to agree on a secret key.
Alice makes N queries to f in Step 1 and at most N queries to g in Step 4 because
there are
√
N
√
N = N pairs of elements of X ′ and one of them is the correct one.
As for Bob, he makes an expected O(N) queries to f in Step 2 and a singe query
to g in Step 3. Indeed, since the domain of f contains N2 elements, he can invert
an element in Y with probability (close to 1) after O(N) = O(
√
N2 ) queries using
probabilistic arguments. His time for sorting and binary search is neglected since
the oracle is not involved.
Therefore, the total expected number of queries to f and g is therefore in O(N)
for both legitimate parties. If the protocol is constructed over a binary random
oracle, it will have to be called O(N logN) times since it takes O(logN) binary
queries to compute either function on any given input (see Section 4.1).
5.1.1 Quantum Attack
Again all the cryptanalytic attacks against this scheme such as direct use of Grover’s
algorithm, generalized Grover’s algorithm, or amplitude amplification [26] require
of the eavesdropper Ω(N5/4) queries to functions f and/or g. For a review of these
essential search tools, we refer the reader to Section 2.12.
However, the same powerful attack used in Section 4.1.1 allows the eavesdropper
to learn Alice and Bob’s key (x, x′) with an expected O(N13/12
√
logN) quantum
queries to f and O(
√
N) quantum queries to g.
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Theorem 5.1.1. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the pair (x, x′)
in Protocol 3 with O(N13/12
√
logN) expected quantum queries to functions f and g.
Proof. An eavesdropper proceeds with quantum walks in a graph very similar to the
one explained in Section 4.1.1, except that now the vertices in the graph contain r
distinct elements of X ′ (rather than of X) and the function’s domain size is N2
rather than N3. In this case, the eavesdropper can find random elements of X ′
from his knowledge of Y ′ with an expected
O
(√
N2/
√
N
)
= O
(
N3/4
)
queries to f per element of X ′, using generalized Grover’s algorithm. Therefore,
the set up cost is S = O(rN3/4) queries to f , which corresponds to find r elements
in X ′. The update cost is U = O(N3/4) queries to f , which corresponds to find one
element in X ′ not already in the node. The checking cost is C = O(r) queries to g
using Grover’s algorithm, which requires to decide if there is a pair (x, x′) in the
node such that g(x, x′) = w, which is the value sent from Bob to Alice. Finally,
the eigenvalue gap δ remains in Ω(1/r log r) but ε changes into Ω(r2/N).
Putting all necessary ingredients together, and using the MNRS theorem, the
expected cryptanalytic cost is in the order of:
S +
1√
ε
(
1√
δ
U + C
)
= S +
√
N
r
(√
r log rU + C
)
=
(
rN3/4 queries to f
)
+
√
N
r
(√
r log r(N3/4 queries to f) + (r queries to g)
)
=
(
rN3/4 +
N5/4√
r
√
log r
)
queries to f and
√
N queries to g .
To minimize the number of queries to f , we choose r so that rN3/4 = N5/4/
√
r,
which is r = N1/3. It follows that a quantum eavesdropper finds the key (x, x′)
with an expected O(N13/12
√
logN) queries to f and O(
√
N ) queries to g.
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Note that the use of Grover’s algorithm in the checking phase was not necessary
to prove the theorem. Should this step be carried out classically, this would result
in C = O(r2) queries to g or O(N5/6) queries to g in total.
5.1.2 Lower Bound
The proof that it is impossible to find the key (x, x′) with fewer than Ω(N13/12)
quantum queries to f and/or g, except with vanishing probability, follows the same
lines as the lower bound proofs in Chapter 4 with one main difference in the fourth
step.
Theorem 5.1.2 (Eavesdropping lower bound). Any eavesdropping strategy A that
knows of the key (x, x′) in Protocol 3 requires a total of Ω(N13/12) quantum queries
to functions f and g. Besides, any strategy A asking o(N13/12) queries can find the
key only with o(1) probability over the random views of the protocol.
Views are described in Section 2.6.1 and finding cryptographic lower bounds
using reduction approach is reviewed in Section 2.14. For the reader’s convenience,
we start with a brief recall of the proof steps of this theorem.
1. We compose the element distinctness problem (ED) with N instances of
pSEARCH to obtain a search problem H = ED ◦ pSEARCHN .
2. We prove a lower bound on the difficulty to solve H (Lemma 7);
3. We reduce H to a less structured problem H′ (Lemma 8); and
4. We reduce H′ to the eavesdropping problem against our protocol.
For the first step, consider a function ξ : [
√
N ] → [√N ] such that there is a
single pair (i, j), 1 6 i < j 6
√
N , for which ξ(i) = ξ(j), which is (a variant) of the
element distinctness problem defined on a smaller domain. Ambainis’ algorithm [4]
can find this pair with Ω((
√
N )2/3) = Ω(N1/3) queries to function ξ and Aaronson
and Shi proved that this is optimal even for the decision version of this problem [2].
Before proceeding, recall that [K]′ denotes {0} ∪ [K] for any natural number K.
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Now, consider a function h : [
√
N ]× [N3/2]→ [√N ]′ where h(i, ·) denotes the
ith bucket, 1 6 i 6
√
N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one.
There is a single random xi ∈ [N3/2] such that h(i, xi) = ξ(i). Symbolically,
h(i, j) =
 ξ(i) if j = xi0 otherwise .
From the definitions of ξ and h follows that there is a single pair of distinct a and b
in the domain of h such that h(a) = h(b) 6= 0. Given an oracle access for h but no
direct access to ξ, the query complexity of this problem is given by the following
lemma.
Lemma 7. Given h structured as above, finding the pair of distinct elements a and
b in the domain of h such that h(a) = h(b) 6= 0 requires Ω(N13/12) quantum queries
to h. Besides, any algorithm A making o(N13/12) queries can solve this problem
only with o(1) probability over the coin tosses of A and the random oracles.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Lemma 1, mutatis mutandis. The search
problem is a composition of element distinctness across buckets with finding the
single non-zero entry in each bucket. More precisely, it is a problem of searching
among N3/2 possibilities for the unique non-zero h(i, ·) for each i, and then finding
two of those
√
N elements that are equal. It is a special case of Theorem 2.13.8,
but with parameters κ =
√
N (the number of buckets) and η = N3/2 (the size of
the buckets). It follows that finding the desired pair (a, b) requires
Ω(κ2/3η1/2) = Ω
(√
N
2/3√
N3/2
)
= Ω(N13/12)
quantum queries to h, except with vanishing probability.
Let h′ : [N2]→ [√N ]′ × [√N ]′ denote the less structured version of the same
search problem for h, defined the same way as in Section 4.1.2, mutatis mutandis.
There is a single pair of distinct elements a and b such that pi2(h
′(a)) = pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0.
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Finding this pair is at least as difficult as finding the collision in h. This argument is
formalized by the following lemma whose proof is the same as that in Section 4.1.2.
Lemma 8. Given h′ structured as above, finding the pair of distinct elements a
and b in the domain of h′ such that pi2(h′(a)) = pi2(h′(b)) 6= 0 requires Ω(N13/12)
quantum queries to h′, except with vanishing probability.
Finally, it remains to show that the search problem concerning h′ reduces to
the cryptanalytic difficulty for the eavesdropper against the running protocol.
Proof. Consider any eavesdropping strategy A that listens to the communication
between Alice and Bob and tries to learn the key (x, x′) by querying f and g.
The reduction does not have direct access to machines Alice and Bob, but rather
to h′ : [N2]→ [√N ]′ × [√N ]′ as described above for which we want to solve the
search problem using A as a subroutine.
We choose random functions fˆ : [N2]→ [Nk] and gˆ : [N2]×[N2]→ [Nk′ ] as well
as a random Boolean s ∈ {true, false} which has the same purpose as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1.2. Let Im(fˆ) denote the image of function fˆ . We then supply A with
a fake “conversation” between “Alice” and “Bob” as follows. We choose randomly√
N points y′1, y
′
2,. . . , y
′√
N
in [Nk], denoted by the subset Y ′ say, N −√N points
y1, y2, . . . , yN−√N in Im(fˆ), denoted by Y
′′, and one point w ∈ [Nk′ ]. We pretend
that Alice has sent the list Y ′ ∪ Y ′′ to Bob (in random order) and that Bob has
responded with Y ′ in increasing order, and w.
We explain why Y ′ and Y ′′ should be sent in two different orders. If Bob sends
Y ′ to Alice in the same order she received, then this would imply that (at least)
the last element in Y ′, that is y′√
N
, contains the first half of the secret, say. If this
is the occurrence, a quantum eavesdropper proceeds as follows. Using Grover’s
algorithm, he first inverts y′√
N
, which can be done in O(N) queries. Let x denote
this part of the secret. Using x, he can invert g(x, x′) also using Grover’s algorithm,
which can be done again in O(N) queries. Note that Grover’s search space is [N2]
in both steps. Continuing Step 4, the reduction using A as a subroutine is derived
as follows.
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We wait for A’s queries to f and g.
– When A asks for f(i) for some i ∈ [N2], there are two possibilities:
– If h′(i) = (0, 0), return fˆ(i) to A as value for f(i).
– Otherwise, return y′pi1(h′(i)) .
– When A asks for g(i, j) for some i, j ∈ [N2], there are two possibilities:
– If pi2(h
′(i)) = pi2(h′(j)) 6= 0 and either s is true and i < j or s is false and
i > j, return w as value for g(i, j).
– Otherwise, return gˆ(i, j).
Suppose A correctly returns the pair (i, j) for which it was told that g(i, j) = w,
which is what a successful eavesdropper is supposed to do. This pair is in fact the
answer to the search problem concerning function h′. Indeed g(i, j) = w only for
the pair (i, j) for which pi2(h
′(i)) = pi2(h′(j)) 6= 0, except with the polynomially
vanishing probability that gˆ(i′, j′) = w for some query (i′, j′) that A asks about g.
Actually, this event happens with a vanishing probability N4/Nk
′
(Section 5.3.4).
To create an environment identical to the real one we need an additional con-
dition: if y ∈ Y ′′ then h′(f−1(y)) = (0, 0). This is required for all elements in Y ′′
to be accessible when A is querying f in the reduction. Except with vanishing
probability, this condition is easily satisfied when k is large enough, which is the
case here.
Provided the condition under discussion on Y ′′ is satisfied, queries asked by A
concerning f and g are answered in the same way as they would be if both f and
g were random functions consistent with the Y ′, Y ′′ and w announced by Alice
and Bob during the execution of the protocol. Indeed, remember that Y ′ and Y ′′
(subsets of [Nk]) and w (element of [Nk
′
]) are uniformly picked at random in both
the simulated and the real worlds. Moreover, the simulated function f is such that
f(i) is random when h′(i) = (0, 0). Among these N2−√N input values, there are
exactly N −√N output values in Y ′′ as expected by A. The remaining √N input
values 1 6 i 6
√
N , also satisfy f(i) ∈ Y ′ as it should be. On the other hand, the
simulated function g is random everywhere except for one single pair (i, j), i 6= j,
for which g(i, j) = w, as it is also expected by A. Therefore, A will behave in
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the environment provided by the simulation exactly as in the real case. Since we
disregard the vanishing possibility that g might not be one-to-one, the reduction
solves the search problem concerning h′ whenever A succeeds in finding the secret.
It follows that any successful cryptanalytic strategy that makes o(N13/12) total
queries to f and/or g would solve the search problem with only o(N13/12) queries
to function h′, which is impossible by Lemma 8, except with vanishing probabil-
ity. This demonstrates the Ω(N13/12) lower bound on the quantum eavesdropping
difficulty against our classical protocol, which matches the upper bound provided
explicitly in Section 5.1.1. Therefore, it is possible for classical Alice and Bob to
agree on a secret after an expected number of queries in the order of N whereas it
is not possible, even for a quantum eavesdropper, to be privy of their secret with
the same query complexity, except with vanishing probability.
For pedagogical reason we mention briefly another method to prove Step 4. The
key observation is to prove that only X ′ provides useful information. Equivalently,
the remaining part X \ X ′, provides no more than purely random information.
Consequently, the reduction becomes exactly as in the last step of Theorem 4.1.2.
In fact, we proved this reduction, but we don’t mention it here to maintain the flow
of writing. This method provides us with the following general useful observation:
in such context, providing the adversary with information independent of the secret
key is not helpful at all.
In the upcoming protocol we present not only a more interesting result but also
a simpler lower-bound proof.
5.2 The Θ(N7/6) Classical Protocol
Similarly to Protocol 2 in Chapter 4 , we assume the existence of two black-box
functions f : [N2]→ [Nk] and t : [N2]→ [Nk′ ] that can be accessed in quantum
superposition of inputs. Take k > 4 so that the function f is one-to-one, except
with polynomially vanishing probability.
The constant k′ is chosen large enough to ensure that t is one-to-one, and
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for any integer w, there are no distinct elements {a, b, c, d} such t(a)⊕ t(b) = w
and t(c)⊕ t(d) = w, except with vanishing probability. The problem becomes a
special case of Theorem 6.1.1. Therefore, the probability of this event is at most
N8/Nk
′
, which vanishes quickly for any k′ > 8. Actually, this probability is at
most N4/Nk
′
, vanishing for any k′ > 4; however, we don’t bother with this issue.
For simplicity, we shall systematically disregard the possibility that such exceptions
might occur. We give now the protocol, whose first two steps are exactly the same
as in Protocol 3.
Protocol 4 (Classical parties vs quantum adversaries).
1. Alice picks at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , with xi ∈ [N2] and
transmits their encrypted values yi = f(xi) to Bob. Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N}
be the secret set of Alice and Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N} be the set sent to Bob.
2. Bob finds the pre-images x and x′ of two distinct random elements in Y.
To find each one of them, he chooses random distinct values in [N2] and
applies f to them until one is found whose image is in Y. He is expected to
succeed after O(N) queries to function f .
3. Bob sends back w = t(x)⊕ t(x′) to Alice.
4. Alice queries the oracle t on her randomly chosen set X she has kept secret.
There are only N2 candidate pairs (xi, xj) ∈ X ×X such that t(xi)⊕ t(xj)
could equal w. Therefore, she can find the unique pair (xi, xj) without any
additional queries. The key established by Alice and Bob is (x, x′) with x < x′.
Clearly, the expected classical queries to f and t is in O(N) for legitimate
parties.
5.2.1 Quantum Attack
The same quantum attack used in Section 4.2.1, which combines the subset-finding
algorithm [4, 36] with the quantum algorithm for testing group commutativity [58],
allows the eavesdropper Eave to recover Alice and Bob’s key (x, x′) with an expected
O(N7/6
√
logN) queries to f and O(N2/3
√
logN) queries to g.
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Theorem 5.2.1. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the pair (x, x′)
in Protocol 4 with O(N7/6
√
logN) expected quantum queries to functions f and t.
Proof. A quantum eavesdropper can set up a quantum attack very similar to the
one explained in Section 4.2.1, except that now the functions domain size is N2
instead of N3. Compared with Protocol 3, the set X ′ doesn’t exist any more. Since
Y is known, the eavesdropper can find random elements of X with an expected
O
(√
N2/N
)
= O
(√
N
)
queries to f per element of X. Therefore, the setup cost S = O(r
√
N) queries to f
and r queries to t, the update cost U = O(
√
N) queries to f and one query to t,
and the checking cost C = 0. Note that ε becomes in Ω(r2/N2) in this graph.
Putting it all together, the expected quantum cryptanalytic cost is
S + N
r
(√
r log rU
)
=
(
r
√
N +
N3/2√
r
√
log r
)
queries to f and
(
r +
N√
r
√
log r
)
queries to t .
To minimize the number of queries to f , we choose r so that rN1/2 = N3/2/
√
r,
which is r = N2/3. It follows that a quantum eavesdropper can find the key (x, x′)
with an expected O(N7/6
√
logN) queries to f and O(N2/3
√
logN) queries to t.
5.2.2 Lower Bound
To prove the hereunder theorem, we follow the same lines as the lower bound proof
in Section 4.2.2.
Theorem 5.2.2 (Eavesdropping lower bound). Any eavesdropping strategy that
learns the key (x, x′) in Protocol 4 requires a total of Ω(N7/6) quantum queries to
functions f and t. Besides, any strategy A making o(N7/6) queries can find this
secret key only with o(1) probability over the random views of the protocol.
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5.3 Technical Discussions
In this section we discuss in more details some relevant issues we put then here for
the readers’s convenience.
5.3.1 Negligible vs Vanishing Probability of Collisions
We discuss why we are satisfied with vanishing probability of collisions in functions
rather than negligible probability. The are two reasons.
First of all requiring the stronger assumption does not provide any security
advantage since any quantum adversary making O(N2) queries is able to break any
key agreement protocol in random oracle model up to some logarithmic factor, at
the time of writing. Classically, this upper bound is optimal and super-polynomial
security against quantum adversaries is impossible in this model.
The second reason is problematic in some cases, in particular, when considering
binary oracle which implements a random function from integers to {0, 1}. Consider
for instance a black-box function f : [N3]→ [Nk]. The domain size of this function
is the maximum possible such that Alice and Bob can agree on a secret even using
a quantum computer. Classically, this domain must be reduced to N2 points.
Anyway, for the purpose of our argument, it does not matter as long as the domain
size is polynomial in N . In order to avoid collisions in the image of f except with
negligible probability, it is necessary to have a range of exponential size, taking into
account the definition of negligible functions (see Definition 2.1.1). Accordingly,
each image requires poly(N) bits to be represented and each query i ∈ [N3] for f
requires poly(N) queries to its corresponding binary oracle to construct the integer
f(i). We could no longer disregard this polynomial factor in our analyses, should we
have considered functions with exponential range as we could do with logarithmic
factors. Therefore, it is necessary that the range size to be polynomially upper-
bounded, otherwise all the lower-bound proofs fail.
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5.3.2 Negligible vs Vanishing Adversarial Success Probability
In standard cryptography an efficient adversary can succeed in breaking any scheme
only with negligible probability, which is a necessary condition to satisfy. For this,
consider an efficient algorithm A who succeeds in breaking a scheme with non-
negligible probability, that is, with probability 1/poly(N) for some polynomial poly.
By repeating A a polynomial number of times, this probability could be amplified
significantly while preserving the overall polynomial running time, since polynomi-
als are closed under composition or multiplication. However, if the probability of
success is negligible then it remains so even after running A as a subroutine a poly-
nomial number of times. Therefore, in our security framework it doesn’t worth to
require negligible adversarial success probability because all known protocols can
be broken by a polynomial adversary. In other words, such requirement does not
have any security advantage.
5.3.3 Needed Optimal Bounds in Composition Theorem
In this section we explain why the lower bound of 2XOR must be optimal before
using it in the composition theorem.
Since our proof of the lower bound is derived using the generalized adversary
method [81], the considered problems must have adversary bounds in order to
apply the composition theorem. In our context, the adversary bound of the inner
function pSEARCH is proven [29], however, we do not know that of 2XOR. Here is
the key idea to get around this matter.
We already know that the quantum algorithm for element distinctness [4] makes
O(N2/3) queries and this is optimal [2]. In Section 4.2.3 we proved an Ω(N2/3)
lower bound for 2XOR using a probabilistic reduction from element distinctness.
However, we cannot use it immediately as an adversary bound. Now, the quantum
algorithms for element distinctness [4, 36] solve 2XOR in O(N2/3) quantum queries.
Therefore, the 2XOR problem has query complexity Θ(N2/3). We need one more
step.
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A recent theorem of Ref. [56] shows that the generalized adversary bound is
tight for total and partial functions. Since we know the tight bounds of 2XOR, we
conclude that there exist an Ω(N2/3) adversary bound for it. There is no need to
find it explicitly!
5.3.4 Probability of Collisions in Oracle Functions
In this section we compute the probability that two elements are mapped to the
same image under a given function f : [D] → [R] for two integers D and R. This
event is known as collision of the function denoted by Coll. We consider two cases:
the classical case and the quantum one, although the latter equally deals with the
former.
First, we examine the quantum case that may be easier to understand. Since
quantum queries are usually made in superposition of all possible inputs, it is
mandatory to calculate the probability of a collision as if the running quantum
algorithm evaluates f on all the points in the domain at once, that is, D queries.
Therefore, the problem can be thought of as a variant of the birthday problem
(Section 2.8.6), that we reformulate it here for our convenience.
Denoted by ε, the probability of finding at least one collision after D evaluations
is estimated to be 1− e−D22R . In our situation we always need to learn the minimal
size of the range R for which a collision occurs only with vanishing probability.
Therefore, we solve R as a function of M and ε:
R >
D2
2 ln 1
1−ε
·
In the black-box model, we can simply consider R D2 so that ε vanishes quickly.
For example, the probability of a collision in f : [N2]→ [Nk] vanishes if k > 4.
Equivalently, the probability is in o(1).
Actually, we can simply take other values making the probability of collisions
vanish quadratically or even faster. For k = 6, the probability of collision vanishes
super-quadratically.
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In classical computations, the shortest answer is that the previous probability
estimation holds as well. For more accurate probability estimation, things require
little more work because we should consider the maximum number of queries that
may be made to the oracle by a classical algorithm.
For exemplification, consider a T -query classical algorithm A making at most T
queries to f . The answer to any new (or previously unasked query) i, for 1 6 i 6 T ,
is a random number independent of all the answers to the i − 1 previously asked
queries. More formally, we fix distinct elements x1, x2 ∈ [N3] and some y ∈ [Nk].
Since f is a random oralce function, then
Pr[f(x1) = f(x2) = y] = 1/N
k.
We are interested in upper-bounding this probability rather than computing it
exactly. For each query i with 1 6 i 6 T , the probability that it gets the same
value as a previously asked query is less than T/Nk. We refer to this event by CollTi
while Coll is the event of a collision after T queries. Then,
Pr[Coll] = Pr[
⋃
16i6T
CollTi ] 6
T 2
Nk
.
Thus, the probability of Coll is less than T 2/Nk.
CHAPTER 6
GENERALIZED PROTOCOLS
We presented in Chapter 4 two original protocols for secret-key agreement over a
classical channel, in which legitimate parties are allowed to use quantum computers.
Furthermore, we gave in Chapter 5 the first two protocols secure against quantum
adversaries even when legitimate parties are restricted to use classical computing.
We wonder whether the protocols in these chapters are optimal. In this chapter,
we answer this question by generalizing our protocols, both classical and quantum.
In Sections 4.2 and 5.2, we described these protocols, in which Bob finds a pair of
preimages (x, x′) in Alice’s randomly selected set X, then sends back t(x)⊕ t(x′)
where t is some black-box (or oracle) function and ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive-or.
These protocols can be extended straightforwardly as follows. Bob finds k elements
of X, for some constant k > 2, and sends the ⊕ of their images under t to Alice.
Accordingly, we obtain sequences of classical and quantum protocols, denoted
by Ck and Qk, respectively, with the following properties. In protocol Ck, a classical
Alice establishes a key with a classical Bob in O(N) queries to a random oracle
in such a way that the optimal quantum eavesdropping strategy requires of the
eavesdropper to query the same oracle Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
expected times.
In protocol Qk, a classical Alice establishes a key with a quantum Bob in O(N)
queries to a random oracle in such a way that the optimal quantum eavesdropping
strategy requires of the eavesdropper to query the same random oracle Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
expected times. Note that only Bob needs to be quantum in this setting, and our
attacks against both sequences are similar to those exploited in Chapters 4 and 5,
but they are supplemented by new ones.
The protocols presented in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2 are particular cases of
these sequences, and therefore we refer to them as C2 and Q2, respectively. The
two sequences are based on the kXOR problem (see Section 2.8.4), which is a special
case of the kSUM problem (see Section 2.8.5).
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Besides, the kXOR problem is related to another family of problems known as
the k-element distinctness or element k-distinctness problem, which is well studied
in terms of quantum as well as classical query complexity [45, 57, 65]. For instance,
element distinctness is exactly 2XOR with w = 0.
Using quantum walks on Johnson graphs, Ambainis’s k-element distinctness
algorithm [4] is done in O(N
k
k+1 ) queries. As proved by Childs and Eisenberg [36],
this algorithm can be applied to any problem that can be reduced to subset-finding
(see Section 2.8.3), in particular kXOR and kSUM.
Given a black-box function of domain sizeN , the subset-finding algorithm [4, 36]
can find a subset of k elements having some given property with an expected
O(Nk/k+1) quantum queries (see Section 2.12.4).
Recalling Definition 2.8.10, letG be a finite Abelian group and w be an arbitrary
element of G. Given a positive integer k, the kSUM problem is to decide whether
an input x = x1 . . . xN ∈ GN contains a subset of k elements that sum to w. Belovs
and Sˇpalek [15] proved that the quantum query complexity of kSUM is Ω(Nk/k+1)
provided |G| > Nk where |G| denotes the size of the group. Actually, this lower
bound matches the upper bound that can be obtained by applying the subset
finding algorithm [36]. Therefore, this latter is optimal for this problem as was
expected in the paper [36].
We prove in this chapter that our generalized protocols have the aforementioned
level of security, however, after modifying them slightly by switching back to kSUM,
which we had already considered in our research and tried to prove its lower bound.
As we did in the previous chapters, it suffices to consider the abelian group
G = Z`2 with ⊕ as addition modulo 2 and ` an integer. We also take the range of
the black-box function large enough to ensure that the legitimate parties can agree
on the same key. This is possible thanks to Theorem 6.1.1. It turns out that this
condition on the range is also sufficient for the lower bound for kSUM [15] to hold.
Be aware that it is understood hereinafter that all the addition operations in the
upcoming protocols are done modulo 2, whether we use + or ⊕.
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6.1 Generalized Classical Protocols
Before proceeding with the protocols, we prove a theorem that is needed to prove
the correctness of protocols as well as to invoke the lower bound theorem for kSUM.
Theorem 6.1.1. Consider a black-box function g : [Nn]→ [Nm], positive integers
m,n, k and N , and select uniformly at random a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk from [N
n].
Then, for m > 2kn, the probability that g(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ g(ak) = g(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ g(bk) is
vanishing. Furthermore, g is also one-to-one, except with vanishing probability.
Proof. Let Coll denotes the event that g(a1)⊕· · ·⊕g(ak) = g(b1)⊕· · ·⊕g(bk) when
a1, . . . , ak and b1, . . . , bk are randomly chosen from [N
n]. The key observation is
that the event Coll requiring 2k elements in [Nn] happens with the same probability
as a collision requiring two k-tuples in a function h : [Nn]k → [Nm]. More precisely,
the probability of Coll is the same as finding two elements x, y ∈ [Nn]k such that
h(x) = h(y) = w, where h(z) = g(c1)⊕· · ·⊕ g(ck) for some z = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ [Nn].
Hence, we come back to the birthday problem (reviewed in Section 2.8.6), which
would say that this event happens with probability upper-bounded by the square
of the domain size divided by the range size. Equivalently, the probability of Coll is
bounded above by N2kn/Nm, which is in o(1).
The second part is a direct consequence. For any k > 1, which is always the case
in our context, the function g is one-to-one except with vanishing probability.
For the purpose of classical schemes, assume the existence of two black-box
functions f : [N2]→ [N c] and g : [N2]→ [N c′ ]. The constant c is chosen exactly as
in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, except that we changed its name to avoid confusion with
the constant k that is used to identify sequences. Hence, we consider c > 4 to
ensure that f is one-to-one, except with vanishing probability.
The constant c′ should satisfy two requirements: it is chosen so large that the
lower bound theorem for kSUM requiring |G| > Nk can be applied; and there is a
unique solution for the kSUM problem, allowing legitimate parties to agree on the
same key, except with vanishing probability. Fortunately, these two requirements
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can easily be met in our case. The first condition is satisfied by letting c′ > k.
To meet the second one, we choose c′ such that for any 2k elements a1, . . . , ak and
b1, . . . , bk, the probability that g(a1)⊕· · ·⊕ g(ak) = g(b1)⊕· · ·⊕ g(bk) is vanishing.
Therefore, using Theorem 6.1.1, we choose c′ > 4k to satisfy the two requirements.
Now, we are ready to present the classical protocol Ck, for any k > 2. Only the
first step remains the same, compared with our earlier discussed protocols.
Protocol 5 (Classical parties vs quantum adversaries).
1. Alice chooses at random N distinct points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of
function f , and transmits the encrypted set, Y = {f(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N}, to Bob.
Let X = {xi | 1 6 i 6 N}.
2. Bob finds k distinct elements in X, denoted by b1, b2, . . . , bk. To find each
one of them, he chooses random distinct values in [N2] and queries f on
them until one is found whose image is in Y . He is expected to succeed with
probability arbitrary close to one in O(N2/N) = O(N) queries to function f .
3. Bob sends back w = g(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ g(bk) to Alice.
4. Alice queries the oracle g on her set X. Although there are Nk candidate
k-tuples such that g(a1)⊕ · · · ⊕ g(ak) could equal w, she can find the unique
tuple without any additional queries. The common secret between Alice and
Bob is (b1, . . . , bk) where the components of this tuple are in some public order.
Calculating the legitimate complexities, each legitimate party asks a total of
O(N) classical queries. Indeed, Alice asks exactly N queries to f in Step 1 and
N queries to g in Step 4. Bob asks O(N) queries to f in Step 2 (use probabilistic
arguments to calculate this bound) and k queries to g in Step 3.
6.1.1 Quantum Attack
An eavesdropper attacking the protocol proceeds by a quantum walk algorithm,
similar to that exploited in Section 4.2.1, and whose query complexity is formulated
by the following theorem.
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Theorem 6.1.2. There exists a eavesdropping strategy that outputs the k-tuple
(b1, . . . , bk) in Protocol 5 with an expected O(N
1
2
+ k
k+1
√
logN) quantum queries to f
and O(N
k
k+1
√
logN) quantum queries to g.
Proof. The eavesdropping strategy is very similar to the subset-finding algorithm.
Indeed, it is necessary and sufficient for the adversary to find k elements of X that
sum to w, which is the value sent from Bob in the last step of Protocol 5. Hence,
it is exactly the kSUM problem, except that the set X is not accessible directly.
Instead of being able to get randomly chosen values in the image of g with a single
query per value, Eave has to get random elements of X by applying BBHT on the
list Y and query g on them, which requires O(
√
N2/N) = O(
√
N ) queries to f and
one query to g per element. Therefore, the number of queries to f , compared to
O(Nk/k+1) queries to g, will be multiplied by O(
√
N) at least. The algorithm also
maintains a data structure to stores the values under g along with the r-tuples.
To analyse the query complexity of our quantum walk algorithm, we apply
Theorem 2.12.4. The set up cost is S = O(r
√
N) queries to f and r queries to g.
The update cost is U = O(
√
N) queries to f and one query to g. The checking
cost C requires us to decide whether there are k elements in the vertex such that
w = g(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ g(bk), which can be done without oracle queries, making C = 0.
The eigenvalue gap δ remains in Ω(1/r log r) but ε changes into Ω(rk/Nk). We can
calculate ε the same way as in Section 4.2.1.
Putting it all together, the expected eavesdropping cost is in the order of
S +
(
Nk/2
rk/2
(
√
r log rU + C)
)
=
(
r
√
N calls to f + r calls to g
)
+ N
k/2
rk/2
√
r log r
(√
N calls to f + 1 call to g
)
=
(
r
√
N +
√
NNk/2
r(k−1)/2
√
log r
)
calls to f and
(
r +
Nk/2
r(k−1)/2
√
log r
)
calls to g .
Neglecting the log factor, we choose r so that r
√
N =
√
NNk/2/r(k−1)/2 to optimize
the number of queries to f and g. This implies r = Nk/k+1 and the theorem follows.
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6.1.2 Lower Bound
The lower bound on the eavesdropper’s query complexity is formalized as follows.
Theorem 6.1.3 (Eavesdropping lower bound). Any eavesdropping strategy A that
learns the key (b1, . . . , bk) in Protocol 5 requires a total of Ω(N
1
2
+ k
k+1 ) quantum
queries to functions f and/or g. Any strategy A asking o(N 12+ kk+1 ) queries can find
the secret key only with vanishing probability over the random views of the protocol.
The proof of this theorem follows the same lines as the lower-bound proof in
Section 4.1.2. The main change is that in the first step we compose the kSUM prob-
lem, instead of element distinctness as in Protocol 1 or kXOR as in Protocol 2, with
N instances of pSEARCH. This defines the search problem H = kSUM◦pSEARCHN .
Consider a black-box function ξ : [N ]→ [M ] and some w ∈ [M ] such that
there exists k elements b1, . . . , bk with w = ξ(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ ξ(bk) where bi ∈ [N ] for
1 6 i 6 N . The problem is to find this k-subset; a variant of kSUM (Section 2.8.5).
By the negative adversary method [80], Belovs and Sˇpalek [15] proved an Ω(Nk/k+1)
quantum lower bound even for the decision version this problem. Conditions on
the range size are already discussed in Chapter 4 and 5.
Consider now a function h : [N ]× [N ]→ [M ]′. The domain of this function
is composed of N “buckets” of size N , where h(i, ·) corresponds to the ith bucket,
1 6 i 6 N . In bucket i, all values of the function are 0 except for one single random
xi ∈ [N ] for which h(i, xi) = ξ(i):
h(i, j) =
 ξ(i) if j = xi0 otherwise .
The definitions of kSUM and h implies that there is a k-subset of distinct elements
in the domain of h such that w = h(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ h(bk). How difficult is it to find
this k-subset given an oracle access for function h but no direct access to ξ?
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Lemma 9 (Lower bound for h). Given h structured as above, finding a k-subset of
distinct elements {b1, . . . , bk} in the domain of h such that w = h(b1)⊕ · · · ⊕ h(bk)
and h(bi) 6= 0, for 1 6 i 6 k, requires Ω(N 12+ kk+1 ) quantum queries to oracle h. Any
strategy asking o(N
1
2
+ k
k+1 ) queries solves this problem only with o(1) probability.
Proof. The problem is then reduced to searching among N possibilities for the
unique non-zero h(i, ·) for each i and then finding k of those elements, among N
possibilities, whose sum equals w. It is the composition of kSUM with pSEARCH.
Since the lower bounds of pSEARCH and kSUM were proven [15, 29] using the
generalized adversary method, we obtain the lower bound of the composed function
h directly using the composition theorem with pSEARCH as inner function [29]. In
particular, this problem becomes a special case of technical Theorem 2.13.8 with
parameters κ = N (the number of buckets) and η = N (the size of the buckets).
Using Theorem 2.13.6 along with the quantum query complexities for kSUM and
pSEARCH, it follows that finding the desired secret requires
Ω(κk/k+1η1/2) = Ω(Nk/k+1
√
N ) = Ω(N
1
2
+ k
k+1 )
quantum queries to h, except with vanishing probability. The remaining part of
the proof is already explained in Section 4.1.2.
6.2 Generalized Quantum Protocols
Similarly to classical protocols, we can generalize the quantum protocols and obtain
a sequence, denoted by Qk for k > 2, with the following properties. In protocol
Qk, classical (or quantum) Alice agrees on a key with a quantum Bob after O(N)
queries to a random oracle in such a way that the optimal quantum eavesdropping
strategy requires of the eavesdropper to access the oracle Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
expected
times. This optimal quantum query complexity can be proven entirely the same
way that we used in Section 6.1. A quantum protocol Qk is similar to classical
protocol Ck except for Step 2, which invokes BBHT, and the function domain size.
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6.3 Quantum Attacks Without Logarithmic Factors
It turns out that all our quantum attacks discussed till now can be done without the
square-root logarithmic factors, thanks to a recent work of Childs and Kothari [35].
Although we don’t care about logarithmic factors, we describe this new attack for
completeness and pedagogical purposes.
In a nutshell, consider any of the preceding attacks that we discussed. If we
could have δ = 1/r instead of 1/r log r, then applying the same formula would give
the desired result. We will describe only the attack against the classical sequence.
For the quantum case, we only state the theorem since the proof is similar.
Theorem 6.3.1. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the k-tuple
in Protocol Ck with an expected O(N
1
2
+ k
k+1 ) quantum queries to functions f and g.
Proof. This new attack combines the subset-finding quantum algorithm [4, 36]
with quantum walks on a Hamming graph H(X, r) whose vertex set is Xr and
there is an edge between two r-tuples (vertices) if and only if they only differ on
one coordinate. Here X is Alice’s secret set and r is a parameter to be determined
optimally later. The eigenvalue gap of this graph is δ ∈ Ω(1/r) [35], which is the
feature behind the removal of the logarithmic factor. As usually, the algorithm
maintains a data structure. Each vertex consists of an r-tuple |u1u2 . . . ur〉 and the
corresponding images under g, where ui ∈ X for 1 6 i 6 r. We are looking for a
(marked) vertex that contains k elements of X such that their sum equals w, which
is the value announced by Bob in Step 3 of the protocol.
The random walk on this graph, identified by a transition matrix P , can be
quantized [59, 75]. We need to know the fraction of marked vertices under the
stationary distribution denoted by ε and the eigenvalue gap denoted by δ = δ(P ).
Afterwards, using Theorem 2.12.4, the complexity of the resulting quantum walk
algorithm is a function of three quantum costs S, U and C.
The set up cost is S = O(r
√
N) queries to f and r queries to g. The update
cost is U = O(
√
N) queries to f and one query to g. The checking cost C = 0.
Following the same method in Section 4.1.1, we get ε ≈ rk/Nk.
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Putting it all together, the expected eavesdropping cost is in the order of
S +
(
Nk/2
rk/2
(
√
rU + C)
)
=
(
r
√
N +
√
NNk/2
r(k−1)/2
)
calls to f and
(
r +
Nk/2
r(k−1)/2
)
calls to g .
We choose r so that r
√
N =
√
NNk/2/r(k−1)/2 to optimize the number of queries
to f and g. This implies r = Nk/k+1 and the theorem follows.
Compared with the attack in Section 4.1.1, the setup phase is much simpler,
being just the direct result of r independent applications of BBHT. Recall that
the setup phase consists in the following two step. The changes only occur in the
second step as we explain below.
1. Prepare the following state as described in Section 4.1 with domain size N2:
|ψ1〉 =
 1√
N2
∑
u1∈[N2]
|u1〉
⊗ · · · ⊗
 1√
N2
∑
ur∈[N2]
|ur〉

2. Produce the superposition state of all possible vertices of the graph:
|ψ2〉 =
(
1√
N
∑
u1∈X
|u1〉
)
⊗ · · · ⊗
(
1√
N
∑
ur∈X
|ur〉
)
To construct |ψ2〉 here, we proceed as follows for each register |ui〉 for 1 6 i 6 r.
We produce a uniform superposition of all elements ui ∈ X by applying BBHT on
the ith register of |ψ1〉. Since we know the exact number of solutions, N , this
state can be produced with certainty in O(
√
N2/N) = O(
√
N) queries even in the
worst case thanks to Theorem 2.12.1. Although we applied Generalized Grover’s
algorithm k times, the total cost remains in O(
√
N ) queries since k is constant.
This attack also holds for any defined quantum protocol Qk as stated formally:
Theorem 6.3.2. There exists an eavesdropping strategy that outputs the k-tuple
in Protocol Qk with an expected O(N
1+ k
k+1 ) quantum queries to functions f and g.
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It is worth mentioning that the comparison between Johnson and Hamming
graphs, based on the calculations obtained from Theorem 2.12.4, reveal that the
order of the coordinates has no significance on the asymptotic behaviour of the
algorithm. As a result, it might be possible to transform one graph into the other.
Using the expressions of Sa´ntha and neglecting normalization, the problem can be
reduced to how to get |φ〉 from |ψ〉 where
|φ〉 =
∑
A⊆X, |X|=r
|A〉
and
|ψ〉 =
(∑
x∈X
|x〉
)⊗r
.
The setup phase in a Johnson graph J(X, r) is to construct |φ〉, or equivalently, to
find r random elements of X. However, considering the structure of our problem,
we can construct |ψ〉, which is exactly the setup phase in a Hamming graph.
Notice finally that upper bounds can be proved using composition theorems for
upper bounds [80]. In fact, we could have derived our upper bounds easily if we had
sacrifice the simplicity of the protocols, which is not a good choice in cryptography.
6.4 Time Complexity
The quantum query complexity has been our measure of complexity throughout
this thesis. However, this section was specifically written for those who equally care
about time complexity. Needless to say, a lower bound on the query complexity of
any problem is a lower bound on the time complexity of the same problem.
Even though our protocols Qk and Ck require classical Alice to ask the oracle
functions only O(N) queries, she has to spend a time in O(N dk/2e) to complete
the protocol using the best algorithm currently known, which is more than linear
when k > 3. However, for k = 2 in the classical setting, and k = 3 in the quantum
setting, we present procedures that achieve Alice’s task in linear time. Depending
on whether or not Alice is quantum, we consider two cases.
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For these procedures, recall that Alice’s set X consists of N distinct random
points, x1, x2, . . . , xN , in the domain of f , and Z = {zi = g(xi) | 1 6 i 6 N} is the
set that Alice obtains by querying the other function on X. Let w denote the value
sent at the last step of the protocol. More precisely, let w = zi1 · · ·+zik with distinct
zij ∈ Z for 1 6 j 6 k. We assume available a quantum random access memory that
can be accessed in superpositions (see Section 2.11.3), otherwise several important
quantum algorithms [4, 20, 25, 32] won’t work any more. Note that, consequently,
Eave could be even less efficient against our protocols!
6.4.1 Classical Alice
When Alice is classical, a direct search approach requires time in O(Nk). However,
she can reduce this time to O(N dk/2e). We first start with the case k = 2, which is
of special importance, then we treat the general case.
Theorem 6.4.1. Given w = g(x) ⊕ g(x′) for random elements x and x′ in X,
classical Alice can find this pair in time O(N logN).
Proof. Assume that w = z⊕ z′ with z, z′ ∈ Z = {g(x) | x ∈ X} and the pair (z, z′)
is unique, except with vanishing probability. After receiving w, Alice builds the set
Dw = {w ⊕ g(x) | x ∈ X}, sorts it and searches two equal elements between D and
Z. Actually, there are two solutions, whether she finds w ⊕ z = z′ or w ⊕ z′ = z.
Either solutions implies z⊕ z′ = w, or equivalently, g(x)⊕ g(x′) = w for x, x′ ∈ X.
It is not difficult to analyse the time complexity: there is nothing more than
searching in sets of size N after sorting them. Therefore, the overall running time
remains in O(N logN).
Now when k > 2, classical Alice can reduce the time complexity to O(N dk/2e)
by a generalization of the previous algorithm, with which we proceed immediately.
Theorem 6.4.2. Given w = g(x1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ g(xk) for random x1, . . . , xk in X,
classical Alice can find these elements in time O(N dk/2e logN).
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Proof. For clarity purposes, we start with the case where k is even; let k = 2m for
some integer m.
1. Assume that w = zi1⊕· · ·⊕zim⊕zim+1⊕· · ·⊕zi2m for z` ∈ Z and 1 6 ` 6 2m.
2. Construct the table Sm containing the sums of all possible m-tuples of distinct
elements of Z. Symbolically,
Sm = {sj = zj1 ⊕ zj2 · · · ⊕ zjm | zp ∈ Z; zp 6= zq; 1 6 p, q 6 m}.
The fact that Sm is of size less than N
m has no significance on the time
complexity. Note that Sm implicitly keeps track of the tuple (zj1 , . . . , zjm)
that corresponds to the sum sj for 1 6 j 6 Nm.
3. Compute a corresponding table Dw = {w ⊕ sj | 1 6 j 6 Nm} where sj ∈ Sm.
Assuming Z contains a unique k-subset {zi1 , . . . , zik} satisfying w, except with
vanishing probability, this implies that w⊕(zim+1⊕· · ·⊕zi2m) = zi1⊕· · ·⊕zim
and there is at least one common m-tuple between Dw and Sm. In fact, there
are k(k − 1) · · · (k −m+ 1) solutions. Sort Dw for the next step.
4. Search an m-subset in Sm that has a match in Dw. It takes O(N
m logN) to
solve this problem; apply any classical search algorithm that finds a match
between two sets. This problem can be solved even faster, having many
solutions. However, it does not change the asymptotic behaviour since k is a
constant.
Note that Alice does not need to store the two tables. We choose this straightfor-
ward method for simple explanation.
We analyse the time complexity of this algorithm. Step 2 takes O(Nm) time
to compute Sm. Step 3 takes O(N
m logN) time to prepare and sort Dw, and
Step 4 is also done in O(Nm logN). Therefore, the overall running time remains
in O(Nk/2 logN).
When k = 2m+ 1, we proceed exactly the same way, except that instead of Sm
we consider Sm+1, which is the set of all sums of m+ 1 elements of Z.
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Unfortunately, for k = 3, the problem become 3SUM, which is long-standing
in classical time complexity. The best known algorithm takes Θ(N2) time [42].
However, we can avoid this problem by providing Alice with quantum computers
(see Section 6.4.2). Recapitulating, our best protocol in the classical setting is C2,
which can be completed legitimately in linear time and query complexity while any
quantum eavesdropper requires Ω(N7/6) quantum queries to learn the secret key.
6.4.2 Quantum Alice
Quantum Alice can achieve the last step of protocol Qk in O(N
dk/2e) time using
Grover’s search, which is perhaps the most straightforward quantum approach.
However, she can do much better. We first start with the case k = 3, where Alice’s
time complexity is linear, then we treat the general case.
Theorem 6.4.3. Given w = g(x) ⊕ g(x′) ⊕ g(x′′) for random x, x′ and x′′ in X,
quantum Alice can find these elements in time O(N logN).
Proof. To search three elements in Z, which sum to w, Alice proceeds as follows:
1. Compute the table Dw = {w ⊕ zp | 1 6 p 6 N ; zp ∈ Z}. We will also need
S2 = {zi ⊕ zj | 1 6 i, j 6 N ; i 6= j}, which is the set of all possible sums of
pairs (zi, zj) ∈ Z × Z with zi 6= zj. Assuming Z contains a unique triplet
(z, z′, z′′) such that w = z⊕z′⊕z′′, except with vanishing probability, implies
that w⊕z′′ = z⊕z′ and there are exactly three sums in Dw that corresponds
to six possible pairs in S2. Sort the table Dw so that one can find any of
its elements in logN time, as a preparation for the next step. Then, load
Dw into a quantum memory (QRAM or QROM) whose model is described
in Section 2.11.3.
2. Apply BBHT to search one out of the six possible pairs (z, z′) in S2 such that
z ⊕ z′ ∈ Dw. Since the search space is N2, this takes O(
√
N2/6) = O(N)
Grover iterations. This step illustrates the fact that a quantum memory
randomly accessible in superpositions is indispensable.
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3. Once a pair (z, z′) is found, there is d ∈ Dw such that z⊕z′ = d, implying that
there exists z′′ ∈ Z such that z⊕ z′ = w⊕ z′′ or equivalently z⊕ z′⊕ z′′ = w.
The overall running time is in O(N logN). Recapitulating, when k = 3 in the
quantum setting, we get our best protocol that can be completed by legitimate
parties in linear time and linear query complexity. Nevertheless, an adversary
needs Ω(N7/4) quantum queries to learn the key, except with vanishing probability
over the random views of the protocol.
Consider now the general case, where k = 2m for some positive integer m > 2.
The case for odd k is slightly different and we address it afterwards.
Theorem 6.4.4. Given w = g(x1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ g(xk) for random x1, . . . , xk of X,
quantum Alice can find this k-subset in time O(Nk/3 logN) when k is even.
Proof. Recall that, given two functions F : A→ R and G : B → R defined on the
same range, a claw is a pair (a, b) ∈ A×B such that F (a) = G(b).
Alice defines two functions f and g having domain size Nm and the same range
as follows:
f, g : Z × Z · · ·Z︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
→ R
such that f(u1, · · · , um) = u1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ um and g(v1, · · · , vm) = w ⊕ (v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vm)
where ui ∈ Z and vi ∈ Z for 1 6 i 6 N . The problem is to find 2m elements of
Z that sum to w. Thus, the problem is reduced to finding a claw in the functions,
that is, two distinct m-tuples, u and v, such that f(u) = g(v).
At this stage, Alice uses the subset-finding algorithm [36] (see Section 2.12.4).
This process takes S2/3 time, where S = Nm is the domain size of f and g, implying
S = N2m/3 = Nk/3. As already mentioned, there are k(k − 1) · · · (k − m + 1)
possible solutions, reducing the time complexity even further but by a constant
factor. Unfortunately, this algorithm has time complexity in O(N4/3) when k = 4,
which is still more than linear.
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When k = 2m + 1, we can do the following step before applying the earlier
procedure. Choose a random element z ∈ Z and set w′ = w⊕ z, thus transforming
the current problem into the earlier one with k′ = 2m′ and m′ = m + 1. We can
certainly use a faster algorithm avoiding this extra element. However, it is just a
slight time overhead for the sake of simplicity.
Note finally that, for any k = 3m, there is an easy approach based on Grover’s
algorithm.
1. Assume that w = zi1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zim ⊕ zim+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ zi3m for zij ∈ Z.
2. Construct the table Sm containing the sums of all possible m-tuples of distinct
elements in Z. It has dimension Nm = Nk/3.
3. Prepare the corresponding table Dw = {w ⊕ sj | 1 6 i 6 Nm} where sj ∈ Sm.
Assuming Z contains a unique k-subset {zi1 , . . . , zik} satisfying w, this implies
that w ⊕ sj = zim+1 ⊕ zim+2 · · · ⊕ zi2m .
4. Define as before the subset S2m having size N
2m. For each specific α ∈ S2m,
we can find a matching element β ∈ Dw using a classical search algorithm in
the sorted table Dw. Indeed, combine this binary search in Dw with Grover’s
search in S2m.
We analyse the time complexity of this algorithm. Step 2 takes time Nm to
compute and keep the table in memory. In Step 3, we apply the addition operation
and sorting on Dw, which can be done in at most O(N
m logN) time. Finally, Step
4 can be done in O(
√
N2m logN) or equivalently O(Nm logN) time. Therefore,
the overall running time is in O(Nk/3), when neglecting the logarithmic factor.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We studied in this thesis the problem of secret-key agreement over a classical com-
munication channel in the random oracle model against quantum eavesdroppers.
The major limitation was the classical channel. This exclude the benefit of trans-
mitting quantum information, which makes quantum key distribution [16] possible.
The other severe restriction emerges when legitimate parties are not allowed to use
any computing resource beyond the classical theory.
Depending on computing resources with which legitimate parties are equipped,
we considered two different settings. In the first one, which we called the classical
setting, legitimate parties are restricted to using classical computers. In the second
one, the quantum setting, legitimate parties have the means to make quantum
computations. In both settings, the eavesdropper trying to learn the established
secret key is assumed to have access to all the communicated messages and any
computing strategy allowed by quantum mechanics. In all our protocols, legitimate
parties query the oracle a number of times proportional to some parameter N . Our
conclusions are divided into three categories: quantum setting, classical setting, and
quantum computing and random oracle model.
7.1 Classical Setting
In the classical setting, which is considered in Chapter 5, we contributed the first
protocol that is secure against any quantum adversary. More precisely, there is
no quantum eavesdropping strategy able to learn the key before asking Ω(N13/12)
quantum queries, in contrast with the common conjecture that “any key agreement
protocol in the random oracle model can be broken with O(N) quantum queries”.
Improving on the first protocol, we gave a scheme requiring Ω(N7/6) quantum
queries of the eavesdropper (Eave).
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Furthermore, for any integer k > 2, we provided a classical protocol Ck with
the following characteristics: a classical Alice establishes a key with a classical Bob
after O(N) queries to random oracles in such a way that the optimal quantum
eavesdropper requires an expected Θ
(
N
1
2
+ k
k+1
)
queries, which tends to Θ(N3/2)
when k increases.
As a result, classical Alice and Bob can establish a secret key against any
quantum eavesdropper with as good a security (in the limit) as it was known to be
possible for quantum Alice and Bob before this work [23].
The main open question would be to break the Ω(N3/2) barrier or prove that
this is not possible. More precisely, the following questions come to light.
1. Is it possible to devise a classical protocol that provides exactly Ω(N3/2)
security. . . or better?!
2. Can every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model be broken with
O(N3/2) quantum queries if legitimate parties remain classical?
3. What is the best possible security gap in the this restrictive setting?
For the first question, we believe that a classical protocol providing exactly Ω(N3/2)
security does exist. Actually, we already have a promising one.
However, concerning the second question, we believe that every key agreement
protocol in the random oracle model in which legitimate parties are classical and
ask O(N) queries can be broken with O(N3/2) quantum queries, thus contrasting
our point of view in the upcoming quantum case. Following our believes, the answer
to Question 3 would be Θ(N3/2) quantum queries.
The following table compares our results with the previous ones in the classical
setting (Alice and Bob are classical while Eave is always quantum).
Previous/Our schemes Problem involved Eave’s lower bound
Merkle’s scheme OR Θ(N)
The first secure protocol ED/SF Θ(N13/12)
The second secure protocol 2XOR Θ(N7/6)
The kth secure protocol Ck, for k > 2 kSUM Θ(N
1
2
+ k
k+1 )
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7.2 Quantum Setting
In the quantum setting (see Chapter 4), we presented two (quantum) protocols
improving on the first attempt [23] to repair Merkle’s scheme. This latter provides
optimal quadratic security in the classical world [8], however, has no security at
all against a quantum eavesdropper applying Grover’s algorithm straightforwardly.
Both protocols require Ω(N5/3) quantum queries of Eave in order to learn the secret.
They are not only better than the earlier Ω(N3/2) scheme [23], but again disagree
with the conjecture that “any key agreement protocol in the random oracle model
can be broken with O(N3/2) quantum queries, when Alice and Bob are quantum”.
Furthermore, for any integer k > 2, we provided a quantum protocolQk with the
following properties: a classical Alice establishes a key with a quantum Bob after
O(N) queries to a random oracle in such a way that any quantum eavesdropper
requires an expected Θ
(
N1+
k
k+1
)
queries, thus approaching Θ(N2) when k increases.
Notice that only Bob needs to be quantum in this setting unless we equally care
about time complexity, which is discussed in Section 6.4.
Consequently, key agreement protocols inspired by Merkle can be arbitrarily as
secure in our quantum world as they were in the classical computer world in 1974.
More precisely, they can be arbitrarily close to quadratic security. Considering our
results, we raise several open questions:
1. Can the quadratic security of Merkle’s scheme be restored exactly rather than
in the limit if all parties make use of quantum computers?
2. Can every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model be broken
with O(N2) quantum queries when legitimate parties are quantum?
3. Is it possible to find a quantum protocol that provides better than quadratic
security. . . ?!
While we believe that a quantum protocol providing exact quadratic security does
exist, it is difficult to speculate on the other two questions. Indeed, even though it
was proven in the classical case that the optimal security is quadratic [8], there is
no compelling evidence that such a limitation exists in a quantum world.
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The following table compares our results with the previous ones in the quantum
setting (Alice might be quantum, Bob and Eave are always quantum).
Previous/Our schemes Problem involved Eave’s lower bound
Brassard-Salvail scheme OR Θ(N3/2)
Our first scheme ED/SF Θ(N5/3)
Our second sceme 2XOR Θ(N5/3)
Our kth protocol Qk, for k > 2 kSUM Θ(N1+
k
k+1 )
Since we highlight our contributions in this section, it is worth mentioning that our
paper at Crypto 2011 [29] was considered for a “Best Paper Award”, according to
an email from the Program Chair.
7.3 Quantum Computing and the Random Oracle Model
In addition to our cryptographic research topic in this thesis, we have explored some
questions related to capabilities and limitations of quantum computing and the
random oracle model. Considering our results, we would like to add the following
observations:
The random oracle model in a quantum world is almost as strong as it is in a
classical world for secret-key agreement, and may be even stronger since the door
is still open for further improved protocols as pointed out in the open questions.
Before this work, quantum computers were a big advantage for eavesdroppers:
Merkle’s scheme collapsed, secure classical key agreement in the random oracle
model was strongly believed to be impossible, and Ω(N3/2) was also conjectured to
be the best possible security level even when Alice and Bob are allowed to use any
quantum strategy. However, in light of our protocols, the situation has changed:
eavesdroppers have essentially no longer any advantage in the quantum setting.
Besides, there is still hope for more improvements, making quantum mechanics
even more useful for cryptographers than adversaries. Furthermore, even when
legitimate parties are classical, the eavesdropper’s task has become much more
difficult after having been as easy as the key agreement process.
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As for quantum power, it is not uncommon to conclude that quantum com-
puters outperform their classical counterparts on some given problem. However,
this work demonstrated the useful property with respect to function composition.
The composition theorems [56, 81] prove that the speedup provided by quantum
computations on two sub-problems making up a composed one is preserved. In our
case, for instance, we introduced a problem that is the composition of kSUM with
the unstructured search problem pSEARCH.
7.4 Life-Style/Cultural Contribution
Yes, the following deserves a section. We want to communicate a profound message!
We introduced the term Eave (for a neutral-gender eavesdropper) instead of
the traditional Eve, which has been used (even by myself in the past) for irrelevant
or ridiculous reasons at the expense of moral values. The major problem is that
people, even scientific ones, often surrender to facts or habits, which may be unfair
or even wrong. Unfortunately, “Eave” is not close to the french word “espion”.
However, this should not be an obstacle to adopting this new term, considering the
good goal.
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